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INTRODUCTION
A discourse concerning the relationship between free speech and
equality has emerged and expanded in recent years, largely in
response to cross burnings in residential areas, the rising incidence of
verbal and physical racial attacks on college campuses, and the corre-
sponding promulgation of hate speech regulations.' Although the
discourse has produced a number of insightful conferences and law
review articles, very little dialogue has been produced; instead, more
often than not, simultaneous or serial monologues have ensued.' In this
Article, I will suggest why there has been a lack of meaningful dia-
l The equality concerns occur across a number of trajectories. These
concerns find expression in notions of anti-discrimination, anti-gay bashing, anti-
sexual harassment and pornography, anti-racist speech, and anti-intimidation
measures. While these concerns share normative and analytical foundations, there
are also important distinctions. The equality analysis developed in this Article
will focus on racial issues and, to a lesser extent, on sexual harassment and
gender issues.
2 The bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma has injected new
energy into the ongoing debate about free speech and equality. Many have
asserted that the bomber belonged to a militia influenced by hatemongers who
spew their invective on various talk shows. Even President Clinton, in a speech
before the convention of the American Association of Community Colleges in
Minneapolis, asserted as much:
[Right-wing talk radio hosts] spread hate. They leave the impression
that, by their very words, violence is acceptable.. . . Well, people like
that who want to share our freedoms must know that their bitter words
can have consequences, and that freedom has endured in this country for
more than two centuries because it was coupled with an enormous sense
of responsibility.
Todd S. Purdum, Terror in Oklahoma: The President; Shifting Debate to the
Political Climate, Clinton Condemns "Promoters of Paranoia, " N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 1995, at A19.
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logue,3 and the limits of trying to address some of these difficult issues
within the existing free speech and equality frameworks.
There are different and distinct narratives for free speech and
equality Most of us operate from one of these narratives rather than the
other. When a problem arises, one sees the problem from the narrative or
world view in which one lives and then proceeds to analyze the problem
from that same narrative. In most instances, people are unaware of the
extent to which they operate within a particular conceptual framework or
even that there are other, competing frameworks. Obviously, if one is
either unaware of alternative narratives or is aware but simply asserts the
priority of one's own conceptual framework, there is no serious engage-
ment between the competing narratives. This failure is a persistent
problem m the effort to address the tensions between free speech and
equality 4 For instance, after a series of racial incidents on a college
' Throughout this Article, I will be emphasizing the need for real dialogue.
This is not to suggest that all of our concerns can be resolved simply by
conversation. I use "real dialogue" in the sense that Professor Richard Bernstein
does:
It would be a gross distortion to imagme that we might conceive of the
entire political realm organized on the principle of dialogue or conversation,
considering the fragile conditions that are required for genuine dialogue and
conversation. Nevertheless, if we think out what is required for such a
dialogue based on mutual understanding, respect, a willingness to listen and
risk one's opinions and prejudices, and a mutual seeking of the correctness
of what is said, we will have defined a powerful regulative ideal that can
onent our practical and political lives.
RICHARD BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBwECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM 162-63 (1983)
(emphasis added). Despite my recognition of the importance of language and
dialogue, I do not believe the issues we face can be resolved through an
idealization of language. Instead, it is the regulative pull of the focus on the
conditions of the ideal speech situation that can advance our efforts on the issue
of racist speech. See infra notes 145-257 and accompanying text.
4 1 question whether the free speech narrative or the equality narrative, as
they are currently understood, are appropriate for addressing many of the issues
of racist speech. The problem is much more difficult than this. By narrative, I
do not mean to suggest that it is simply a story that can be told or not told. Our
narrative gives us our world and ourselves. As Oliver Sacks states, "We have,
each of us, a life story, an inner narrative - whose continuity, whose sense, is
our lives. It might be said that each of us constructs and lives a narrative, that
this narrative is us, our identities. If we wish to know a man, we ask, what is his
story, "OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK IS WIFE FOR A HAT AND
OTHER CLINICAL TALES 105 (1981). Our narratives do not simply describe the
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campus, I often get calls from reporters. They are almost always
interested in whether explicit racist incitements might lead to the
consideration of policies to limit speech by the college. Very few express
concern about the rise of explicit racism and the consequent threat to
equal opportunity for minority groups on college campuses. Most of these
reporters see the problem through the lens of free speech, because that is
the narrative in which they are comfortable or accustomed.' This
effectively makes them only marginally aware of the race discrimination
often present in these incidents. To the extent that they recogmze the
equal opportunity issues, they see these as trumped by free speech
concerns. Their position is not so much thought out as it is reflective,
representing their orientation to the world.
We each have, and indeed must have, an orientation to the world.
The world only makes sense because of a perspective or world view,
which provides the basis for our narratives. There is no such thing as a
natural or neutral perspective.6 These different orientations become a
problem only when one's narrative is asserted as the privileged narrative
over another narrative.7 It is this privileging process that is largely
world, they construct it. As the Harvard philosopher Nelson Goodman asserts:
words, symbols, and metaphors are "world-making." Each narrative makes a
world. He rejects the position that we can get to the real world behind our
narrative, and believes instead that we get to yet another narrative. According to
Professor Goodman, there is no language that merely describes the world. See
NELSON GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING 91-97 (1978); see also Kim Lane
Scheppele, Foreword: TellingStones, 87 MICH. L. REv 2073 (1989) (discussing
generally the role of narratives and storytelling in law).
' Reporters have a special relationship to the First Amendment. They trade
in words. This is one of the reasons for their focus on the speech paradigm. I
believe that the free speech narrative, along with the fact that most of the
reporters that call are white, leads to this lack of express concern regarding
explicit racism on college campuses. It is often acknowledged that our racial
experience and situation has an impact on our perspective and on our world
view. See Darryl Brown, Note, Racism and Race Relations in the University, 76
VA. L. REV 295 (1990) (discussing the causes of racism on college campuses).
Tius acknowledged inpact of racial experience and situation does not suggest
that white reporters cannot have a viewpoint that favors an equality perspective,
or that a black civil rights worker cannot favor a free speech perspective.
6 See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (David E.
Linge trans., 1976); Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV
L. REV 10 (1987) (exploring the "dilemma of difference" in cases before the
United States Supreme Court during the 1986 term).
7 I use "privilege" in this Article to mean one position asserted over another
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responsible for what I refer to as simultaneous or serial monologues.8 In
addressing the rise in explicit racist incidents, there is usually a failure to
recognize the full dimension of the threat to equality on the one side, and
the threat to free speech on the other. Even when there is an apparent
acknowledgement that there is more than one framework for addressing
tis issue, there is seldom a serious effort to consider the claims from
anything other than the favored framework.
The conflicting claims from the disfavored framework are usually
considered primarily to demonstrate error, not to assess their possible
validity This occurs for at least two reasons. First, to consider such
claims seriously could have negative implications for the favored
framework. Second, the two narratives used to address the issue may be
incommensurable. Professor Alasdair MacIntyre describes the dilemma
posed by incommensurable claims:
Every one of the arguments is logically valid or can be easily expanded
so as to be made so; the conclusions do indeed follow from the
premises. But the rival premises are such that we possess no rational
way of weighing the claims of one as against another. For each premise
employs some quite different normative or evaluative concept from the
others, so that the claims made upon us are of quite different kinds.9
While incommensurability suggests that a meaningful comparison of the
claims from conflicting frameworks is problematic, it does not mean that
comparison without favoring either framework is impossible.'
The purpose of this Article is not to show support in favor of free
speech or equality, but to suggest that the heart of the problem is the
inclination to privilege or favor one framework, perspective, story, or set
of metaphors over the others. I will try to suggest an alternative that will
aid in providing ground for a serious comparison and dialogue.
without an adequate and legitimate justification.
' Professor MacIntyre describes a similar process and notes the "shrill tone"
of the debate because the participant is not engaged in a dialogue. ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VmTuE 8 (1981).
9Id.
10 Although Professor MacIntyre suggests incommensurable narratives
cannot be compared, this position is challengedby others. See BERNSTEIN, supra
note 3, at 79-108; Drucilla Cornell, Taking Hegel Seriously: Reflections on
Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 7 CARDozo L. REv 139, 152-60 (1985)
(discussing the philosophy of science).
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Part I describes the different stones told from the free speech and
equality perspectives and examines a number of approaches that are used
to privilege one narrative over the other." Part II searches beyond the
rhetoric of free speech and equality to look at some of their underlying
values. Part II will also examine how harm is or is not addressed m each
narrative. 2 Part HI discusses the role of participation as a mediating
value that is central to both free speech and equality 13 Participation,
properly conceived, offers an alternative common story that enhances our
understanding of and commitment to free speech and equality '4 This
story allows us to conceive of a way of embracing the interests of free
speech and equality without privileging either. In other words, my goal
in this Article is to examine critically how we address the tension
between free speech and equality, not to attempt to offer a formula for
deciding a given case or issue. Part IV sketches out how the approach
discussed in tis Article could inform our efforts to address the hate
speech-induced tension between free speech and equality in two settings,
the workplace and the umversity 5
I. THE COMPETING NARRATIVES
OF FREE SPEECH AND EQUALITY
We and the world we inhabit are constituted through language. 16 We
are given to language before language is given to us. It is through the
structure, metaphor, and symbols that our language helps define us and
the world in which we live. As scholars explored the importance of
language, some hoped that language would be the new foundation for
knowledge and moral discourse.' This was a false hope, presupposing,
" See infra notes 16-144 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 145-257 and accompanying text.
'3 See infra notes 258-98 and accompanying text.
14 I am not suggesting that this new common story is real or "truth." It is
rather a narrative or version of the world. My claim is that it valorizes the core
values of free speech and equality without the privileging that frequently occurs
m the current debate.
" See infra notes 299-348 and accompanying text.
16 See generally GOODMAN, supra note 4; LuDWIG WrITGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombetrans., 1953); Cornell, supra
note 10. Although language is constitutive of the world, it would be a mistake
to believe that language describes, reflects, or embodies all. The world is also a
reflection of power and material conditions.
'7 See generally RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY
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as it did, a language stable over time and circumstances. In actuality,
there are many different stones told in languages that at first glance
might seem the same, but that in reality are not. Our language does not
only describe the world; it interacts with the world of which it is a part.
We not only tell different stones through our narratives, we also inhabit
different worlds constructed by our languages.1 8 Because language is
constitutive of our being, we cannot decide to tell or not to tell our story
The narrative in which we live is the world in which we live. Language,
however, is also open and contingent; we are not hermetically sealed off
from each other. Our stones and worlds are open to revision and change.
These changes do not come about simply by appealing to a meta-
language; they come about by our real participation in the world we
inhabit and wish to Inhabit.'9 My effort m this Article is animated by
the hope for openness through dialogue and participation, and the
necessity of confronting and challenging the danger of domination and
privilege.
Free speech and equality are two narratives that in large measure
describe two different worlds. In a recent article, Professor Richard
Delgado has captured some of the significance of operating from these
different narratives. He describes reactions to racial incidents on college
campuses, first using the voice of a traditional free speech advocate and
then using the voice of a traditional advocate of equal opportunity"
Persons tend to react to the problem of racial insults in one of two
ways. On hearing that a university has enacted rules forbidding certain
forms of speech, some will frame the issue as a first amendment
problem: the rules limit speech, and the Constitution forbids official
regulation of speech without a very good reason. If one takes that
starting point, several consequences follow. First, the burden shifts to
the other side to show that the interest in protecting members of the
campus community from insults and name-callingis compelling enough
to overcome the presumption in favor of free speech. Further, there
must be no less onerous ways of accomplishing that objective. More-
over, some will worry whether the enforcer of the regulation will
(1989); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLMCS (1975).
18 DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND 23-48 (1991).
19 Recognizing the importance of language in constituting the world is not
meant to suggest that the world is only language, or that all problems of the
world can be solved by using existing language. We must also be mindful of the
conditions under which language conflicts arise and are resolved.
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become a censor, imposing narrow-minded restraints on campus
discussion. Some will also be concerned about slippery slopes and line-
drawing problems [For others "the issue" is the scope of an
educational institution's power to promote values of] equal personhood
on campus. Now, the defenders of racially scathing speech are
required to show that the interest in its protection is compelling enough
to overcome the preference for equal personhood; and we will want to
make sure that this interest is advanced in the way least damaging to
equality.
2
One tradition tells the story of people asserting their autonomy
through participation, free thought, and self-expression in the polity This
tradition is very nervous about any government or community con-
stramt.2 Indeed, there is the suggestion that this is the great evil to be
avoided in society The other tradition tells the story of a people whom
communities and government colluded to exclude from any meaningful
participation in the polity or public institutions. It tells a story of a
government that, until recently, actively engaged in efforts to exclude,
and now passively stands by while private actors and powerful social
forces continue to shut the door to full membership in society This
tradition also tells of a long struggle for status, not just as members of the
polity, but as complete and respected human beings.22 Indeed, the great
evil to be avoided, as experienced from this framework, is discrimination
that undermines or destroys membership.
It is not helpful to ask which of these descriptions is more correct.
The assumption that there is some meta-narrative already there, which can
be used to decide which is the better narrative, has added to the confusion
and lack of dialogue in the current debate.23 If one inhabits a world in
20 Richard Delgado, Campus Anti-Racism Rules: Constitutional Narratives
in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REv 343, 345-46 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado,
Campus Anti-Racism Rules] (footnotes omitted).
21 See C. EDwIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-69
passim (1989) (arguing for constitutional protection of the freedom of speech
based on the liberty theory); see also Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.L 877 (1963); JOHN S. MILL, ON
LIBERTY (Stefan Collim ed., Cambridge Umv. Press 1989) (1859).
22 See generally KENNETH L. KARsT, BELONGING TO AMERICA (1989);
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHEREs OF JUSTICE 31-40 (1983).
23 See generally RORTY, supra note 17, at 3-22 (discussing the lack of a
meta-narrative). Professor Goodman also makes the point that narrative cannot
be judged as right or real by some objective language construct because such a
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which equality, or the lack thereof, is the primary concern, then equality
defines one's perspective; if one inhabits a world in which restraint on
self-expression has been the major concern, then the free speech narrative
is more compelling. These are not just important stones or perspectives
that individuals tell and live, they are also great normative values that live
in our Constitution. The question then is not simply which does one
choose, but how may these issues be addressed without privileging one
narrative over the other924
One may protest that this portrayal of these two stones is necessarily
artificial - that the stones have a great deal more in common than they
have differences. While this may be true, the differences have fueled the
current debate and continue to cause much confusion; the two paradigms
often produce conflicting results in the context of racist speech, creating
our current problem. Put another way, although the two narratives do not
lack commonality or symmetry, real tensions exist in their different
versions of the world. The difficulty with identifying, let alone ameliorat-
mg, the tensions stems from what may be the incommensurability of the
two paradigms.
When two systems are incommensurable, there is no apparent shared
measurement to allow for easy comparison, point by point. Even when
one finds what appears to be common ground, one must be careful that
the commonality is real and not illusory Narratives or frameworks may
be incommensurable because they have radically different starting points
or goals. Frameworks may be incommensurable because they subscribe
to a different method for making truth or value claims. Narratives may
also be incommensurable because they describe different worlds. The
problem of incommensurability is not just a problem for scholars. As
Professor MacIntyre suggests, it is this problem that makes addressing so
many contemporary issues so intractable. In noting the different premises
used in the debates about just wars, abortion rights, and property
distribution, he asserts:
It is precisely because there is in our society no established way of
deciding between these claims that moral argument appears to be
necessarily interminable. From our rival conclusions we can argue back
construct does not exist. See GOODMAN, supra note 4.
24 Both free speech and equality are based on the assumption that using
power to dominate is not legitimate. To privilege one narrative over the other
without legitimating one's choice would therefore be an illegitimateuse of power
and violate both narratives' norms.
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to our rival premises; but when we do arrive at our premises argument
ceases and the invocation of one premise against another becomes a
matter of pure assertion and counter-assertion. Hence perhaps the
slightly shrill tone of so much of moral debate.2"
That narratives are incommensurable does not mean they cannot be
compared or mediated, but rather there is not a neutral vantage point
from which to do this. The ground for comparison must be developed by
teasing out from the stones themselves the bases for mediating or
fusing the separate horizons.26 Tis will only be done, however, after
one has given up the false goal of finding a neutral, objective standpoint
from which to measure the competing claims of world views and
reality 
27
There have been many attempts to find this perspectiveless place. All
have failed. For example, while reason and logic have been pressed into
service as the neutral mediators in world view disputes, a number of
commentators recently have shown that reason itself exists within a
context and is historical.28 We are reluctantly beginning to recognize
that if even reason is not stable, we cannot be confident that anyone or
anything enjoys a contextual god's eye view Everyone is standing
someplace. To make comparisons, therefore, requires that one explore the
narratives for differences and commonalities to use in developing possible
mediating values or methods. Such commonalities and differences cannot
always be discovered. They sometimes require a reconstitution of the
narrative through a dialogical process that both discovers and creates
difference and commonality 29
25 MACINTYRE, supra note 8, at 8. For a more extensive discussion of the
problem, see also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALI-
Ty 9 (1988) (exploring the conflicting conceptions of justice).
26 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 143-44.
27 See generally RORTY, supra note 17; BERNSTEIN, supra note 3.
28 So rationality itself, whether theoretical or practical, is a concept with
a history- indeed, since there are a diversity of traditions of enqury,
with histories, there are, so it will turn out, rationalities rather than
rationality, just as it will also turn out that there are justices rather than
justice.
MACINTYRE, supra note 8, at 8; see also LLOYD GENOVESE, THE MAN OF
REASON (1984).
29 BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 96, 161, see also Cornell, supra note 10, at




A. How Narratives Are Privileged
When the issue of hate speech and equality was first being discussed
by the academic commumty, I argued that there was no real conflict
between the values of free speech and equality I did this, m part, because
I believe strongly in both sets of values and could see early on that there
was a threat of privileging one set of values over the other. I also argued
that there was no principled way of choosing one over the other. I was
wrong m my assertion that there was no conflict,3" but correct that there
is no principled way of choosing one over the other. Nor is it desirable
merely to choose one set of constitutional values over the other; I
continue to believe strongly m both. 1 My goal in this Article is to
suggest a framework through which both sets of values can be valorized.
The most common response to the dilemma of the mcommensura-
bility of the free speech and equality narratives is simply to favor one
over the other. There are a number of ways that this has been done. One
way, of course, is simply to deny that there is a conflict.32 Even as this
claim is being made, however, the claimant moves to tell her story and
deny others.33
A second form of privileging is asserting that one set of values is
more important than the other. A number of commentators took this
position prior to the current debate, but never in a credible way
Occasionally, a commentator indicated implicitly that the asserted priority
was so obvious that it was not necessary to support the claim.34 More
often, this position has been justified by assuming that one narrative,
30 The way the free speech narrative describes the issues around racist
speech and the way the equality narrative describes those same issues are often
m direct conflict. See infra notes 61-101 and accompanying text.
3 I am not suggesting that I am neutral or that I have an equal interest or
personal grounding in both sets of values. There are a number of times when
equality and free speech have worked together without conflict. See mnfra notes
61-101 and accompanying text.
32 See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A
Modest Proposal?, 1990 DuKE L.J. 484, 489 (arguing that combatting racial
discrimination and protecting free speech can be mutually reinforcing goals).
" See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, IfHe Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431, Robert C. Post, Racist Speech,
Democracy and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV 267 (1991)
[heremafter Post, Racist Speech]; Strossen, supra note 32.
34 See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 21 (supporting freedom of speech); BAKER,
supra note 21, JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
1996-97]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
value, or context is essential or normal, while the other is non-essential,
or marginal. One frequently occurrmng example of this is the claim that
free speech is a constitutional concern, while equality is only statutory m
the hate speech context. 5 The disfavored narrative may also be charac-
terized as derivative or of lesser value.36 There are two variations of
this. The first takes what could easily be viewed as an equality issue and
categorizes it as a speech issue, or the reverse. The other, more subtle,
variation of this approach addresses the issue of one narrative, but 'from
the framework of the favored narrative:37 'We can talk about your issue
but it must be my story"
" See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse:
Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
103 HARV L. REv 601, 632-63 (1990) [hereinafter Post, Public Discourse]
(discussing the prohibition against racial discrimination as an attempt to
implement a specific image of communal identity).
36 Lawrence, supra note 33, at 473, recounts a story I told demonstrating
this type of privileging. My family and I are vegetarians. My son, Fon, while
going through the line for food during Thanksgiving dinner, noted that there was
more than one type of stuffing. He turned to the person behind him and asked
which stuffing was meat and which was vegetarian. The man responded by
pointing to one of the dishes and said tis is the regular stuffing and the other
is the vegetarian. I spoke up for the benefit of my son and correctedthe man that
there is no regular stuffing - one was meat and the other vegetarian. Simone de
Beauvoir was one of the first modem philosophers to point out that this move
to make one thing essential and the other non-essential was a privilegmg move.
See SIMONE DE BEAUvOiR, THE SECOND SEX at xxix (1968).
There is also a good discussion of this issue by Minow, supra note 6, at 65-
66. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
3" Professor Delgado has addressed tis variation in his discussion of the
incommensurability of free speech and equality. See Delgado, Campus Anti-
Racism Rules, supra note 20.
Addressing one narrative from the framework of the favored narrative is one
of the major flaws in the analysis of R.A.V v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377
(1992). The Court assumed that the major issue in the case was the protection
of free speech. One could argue, however, that it would have been at least as
valid to analyze the problem from the narrative of equality, which may or may
not have produced a different decision, but certainly would have produced a
different analysis. In particular, the Court's analysis of the content-bias aspect of
the statute was misguided when it was the content that was causing the injury of
discrimination. From a largerperspective, the entire doctrine of content neutrality
is better understood as an equality issue, as opposed to a free speech issue. See
KARST, supra note 22.
[VOL. 85
WORLDS APART
Professor Martha Minow notes that the tendency to essentialize the
"norm"f reoccurs throughout legal and social categories.
Legal treatment of difference tends to take for granted an assumed
point of comparison: women are compared to the unstated norm of men,
"minority" races to whites, handicapped persons to the able-bodied
Such assumptions work m part through the very structure of our
language, which embeds the unstated points of comparison inside
categories that bury their perspective and wrongly nnply a natural fit
with the world.38
In our legal history, and even today, there is often the assumption
that the First Amendment is the essential amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment is the unessential or epiphenomenal amendment.39 Tis
position leads to three other variations of favoring one position over the
other. The first variation places on the disfavored position a burden, such
as proving that its position is important or necessary and will not affect
the favored position m a significant way The second and similar
manifestation calls upon the disfavored position to draw bright lines in an
acceptable way that will leave all of the favored framework undisturbed.
Failure to do this suggests that the disfavored position must give way to
38 Minow, supra note 6, at 13.
I  am using "unessential" in the sense discussed by Simone de Beauvoir
in THE SECOND SEX, when she describes men as being considered essential, and
women unessential or the second sex. See DE BEAuvom, supra note 36, at xvi-
xviii. This claim may initially appear excessively strong. After all, who would
consider equality unessential or derivative?
Although such claims are seldom made explicitly, thns assumption is implicit
m a number of cases and claims by commentators. See Emerson, supra note 21.
For a commentator who explicitly argues that equality is derivative, see Peter
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV L. REV 537, 542 (1982).
Although there have been attempts to privilege equality over free speech, I
believe that this is less often the case than the attempt to privilege free speech
over equality. For examples of both, see Lawrence, supra note 33; Strossen,
supra note 32. In current discussions that recognize privileging, there is some
indication that proponents on both sides are equally guilty of making these
arguments. I do not believe tns is the case. Thins approach may give the
appearance of being neutral by recognizing privileging on both sides. Implying
a false system when there is none, however, can obviously create its own set of
problems. See Delgado, Campus Anti-Racism Rules, supra note 20, at 376-80;
Strossen, supra note 32, at 494.
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the essential narrative. The third variation uses the slippery slope
argument, which calls for even greater assurances than the other two.
This variation suggests that even if one can draw acceptable lines in the
current situation, the disfavored narrative must be able to show that the
lines will hold in the future and will not be the start of an unacceptable
descent.
40
The slippery slope argument, m one of its forms, goes something
like this: "If we allow any exception to free speech, what is to stop
the next exception? We will be starting down the slippery slope without
a principled stopping place." One response to such an argument is to
ask, "what is at the top of the slippery slope and how did it get
there?" Professor Frederick Schauer has suggested that slippery slope
arguments are not logical arguments, but rather a metaphor to stop real
analysis.41
In The Tolerant Society, Professor Lee C. Bollinger describes how
line-drawing and burden of proof arguments are used to favor a position
m the context of racist speech: 42 "the line-drawing claim is an appealing
argument for any disputant, and especially for the free speech advocate,
because of two primary characteristics: First, it shifts the burden of
argument onto one's opponents; Second, it seemingly reduces one's
responsibility for the result being reached." '4 Regarding line-drawing
arguments, Bollinger adds: "[it] is one of the most beguiling methods of
obfuscation and diversion in legal argumentation, one that often serves as
a convenent disguise for other purposes and motivations." When one
privileges a position, there is a sense that the claims and conditions for
this position are natural and inevitable. Those who would change them
have the heavy burden of showing that there is a compelling reason for
40 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 35-39 (1986); Frederick
Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv L. REV 361 (1989).
41 See Schauer, supra note 40; see also Steven L. Winter, Transcendental
Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA.
L. REv 1105 (1989) (discussing the use of metaphor). George Lakoff shows that
a large part of our language (story) is metaphorical. See generally GEORGE
LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980). What oftenpasses
for analysis is really metaphor. Tis problem becomes most acute when claimants
are using different metaphors to describe their world.
42 Although Professor Bollinger does not use the term privilege, the concept
is clearly suggested by his analysis of traditional arguments used to advance
positions m free speech discussions. See BOLLINGER, supra note 40, at 43-75.




the change and that the change will be minor.45 They have to draw the
appropriate line and prove that it will hold.
Many of the discussions about the relationship between the claims of
free speech and equality use some form of privileging. In most instances,
those who use these techmques are not even aware they are doing so. Nor
is it always clear to the person advocating the disfavored paradigm that
she has been put on the defensive, not by the force of an argument, but
by the force of slipping into the favored narrative.46 Indeed, the mvisi-
bility of privileging often accounts for the force of its position.
An extreme form of privileging is totalizing: making the claim that
the language of one narrative accurately describes all worlds. The
language is assumed to be umversal. Therefore, everything that needs to
be said about the world can be commumcated through the umversal
language of the only "complete" narrative. All problems, and indeed all
stones, can be unproblematically expressed m the favored framework.
This form of privileging clearly rejects the notion that there are such
things as contexts or competing narratives. It assumes that the world can
be divided up into natural categories that are set out in the language and
that this discourse exhausts the possibilities. It is assumed, for example,
that the world is completely described by all-encompassing categories,
such as rational and irrational, free and unfree, essential and unessential,
or material and spiritual.47 Other possibilities are dismissed as being
's Professor Bollinger goes on to argue that the claim that any regulation of
racist speech would destroy a large area of desired speech lacks persuasive force.
He notes that most other Western democracies have provisions regulating racist
speech. See id. at 39. Professor Man J. Matsuda makes the same observation. See
Man J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REv 2320, 2346-48 (1989) (providing examples of nations
that regulate racist speech).
There are claims and counter-clamis regarding the impact of these provisions
in other countries and the lack of them in the United States. First Amendment
advocates often argue that there is less freedom of speech in these other countries
and that the provisions add to the racial problem. Equality proponents and
citizens of some of these other countries argue that these provisions do not chill
desired speech and that the acceptance of racist speech in the United States
contributes to our racial problems. See David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and
Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV 445, 449-506 (1987) (reviewing international anti-
hate speech laws).
4 See Lawrence, supra note 33, at 474-75.
4' Tins is the problem of intelligible essence, which has been discredited.
See UNGER, supra note 17, at 194.
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illegitimate or nonsensical.48 After all, what would it mean to be neither
rational nor irrational?
Notwithstanding the vigilant adherence to a totalizing narrative by
some, modem philosophers have rejected the claim that there is or can be
one narrative that accurately and comprehensively reflects the world.49
The claim that there is a complete narrative, however, is more than a
philosophical error. This totalized narrative operates to margmalize or
deny any legitimacy to whatever cannot be adequately expressed m it.
This insistence on a unitary voice forces those with other narratives to tell
and live someone else's story This totalizing, therefore, robs others of
their stones and worlds. The struggle in law and in the larger society over
the proper language or narrative, then, is a struggle for legitimacy, law,
and power.5 ° The law is replete with examples of how people have been
coerced through the marginalization or denial of their narratives and the
assumption that anything that needs to be said can be stated in existing
legal categories.5
The Senate Judiciary Committee's response in the Clarence Thom-
as/Amta Hill hearings may be an example of this. In essence, the
Committee insisted that in order for Hill to have credibility, she must
explain herself within a male narrative which they may have assumed was
complete and natural. This narrative tells the story that normal people, if
harassed, will leave.52 Because Hill did not leave, she must either be
judged abnormal, or she must come forward with a good explanation. She
never overcame the burden of this negative assumption. It is interesting
to note, however, that a number of professional women did not share the
negative assumption of the all-male Committee.53
48 See Cornell, supra note 10, at 180-81.
49 See DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL
GOLDEN BRAID 17 (1979) (paraphrasing Kurt G6del's theorem on incomplete-
ness).
0 See Martha Minow, Listening the Right Way, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV 946, 951
(1989) (book review of MORE SPEECH by Paul Chevigny).
" Theorists not only strongly reject these objective claims made in
totalizing, but more specifically, language theorists reject the claim that a
language can be both complete and coherent. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 49.
52 There is a similar male narrative about rape cases. When women have
reported rape to the police, the police often use a male narrative to determine if
there has been a real rape. The white male narrative tells the story of a white
woman being raped by a strange black man. If the white woman is raped by a
white male friend, it may not be a "real rape." For a "real" account of this story,
see Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1087-88 (1986).
3 See Louise F Fitzgerald, Science v. Myth: The Failure of Reason in the
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Another example of how this type of totalizmg can effectively destroy
the voice of "others" is m Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee5 4 The
court was to decide if land had been alienated from a tribe m conflict
with American law The main issue was whether the people were a tribe.
There were a number of legal categorical slots that the Mashpee were
required to fill to qualify as such. One requirement was that its members
be of one race, and another was that the tribe have a leader. Even though
the Mashpee considered themselves a tribe, they could not fit into the
necessary categories set up by the American legal system."5 The tribe
failed to prove that it was made up of one race.56 The court never
acknowledged that the tribe did not use racial categories m the same way
that the law does to divide the world. The Mashpee lost their voice and
land because they did not organize or experience the world m the racial
or leadership terms that we do and because they did not fit into the
"natural categories" that the court used.
Another, more personal example, may demonstrate the same point
about race. I received a fellowship to live and study in Africa for a year.
A number of friends, of different races, suggested that it would be
interesting and amazing to be in a number of countries where I would be
part of the racial majority After being in Africa a short period of time,
I was impressed with how different it was from what these friends had
suggested. Not only was I in a number of countries where I was part of
the racial majority, I was, much more significantly, in countries where the
world was not divided up by race. In this country, we have all come to
assume that this is the way the world is naturally divided. When I left the
large cities, many of the people in Africa could not believe that I could
be a functioning person with an identity and not know to which tribe I
belonged. It did no good for me to profess that my foreparents had come
to the Umted States as slaves. That was, at best, a weak excuse which
still left me without a social identity When I finally complained in
frustration that most African-Americans do not know to which tribe or
ethnic group they belong, my interlocutors stated with hard-won
understanding that I was from the Afican-Amencan tribe.
Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV 1399 (1992) (discussing the
Judiciary Committee's questioning of Anita Hill's credibility and behavior).
5' Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978),
aff'd sub nom. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
55 GeraldTorres & Kathryn Milun, TranslatingYonnondio byPrecedentand
Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DuKE L.J. 625, 633-36.
56 Mashpee Tribe, 447 F Supp. at 949.
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The debate over the abolition of slavery further demonstrates the
destructiveness of totalizmg. The participants in the debate placed the
main issue into the dominant legal narrative of the time: property
Because the slaves had been categorized as legal property for some
purposes, and it was clear that both the Constitution and fair play
required that owners must receive adequate compensation for any
property taken, Congress seriously considered before the Civil War a
number of schemes for abolishing slavery and compensating slave
owners.57 Put simply, freedom could not come at the expense of
property This consequence appeared appropriate from the privileged
narrative of property used by the legal system.
In sum, privileging by totalizing," and thus preventing a people
from living through their own narrative, does not necessarily deny them
the ability to speak or utter.59 It can, however, deprive people of a voice
to make sense of their circumstances and environment, thereby denying
them the chance to constitute and maintain their world.6"
57 See, e.g., WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY- THE GREAT
BATTLE IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 10 (1996) (describing a speech in
which Lincoln explained how the value of slaves as property affected percep-
tions of slavery).
58 One response to totalizmg is to acknowledge that there are indeed
different narratives and that they are all equally valid and incomparable. While
this acknowledgement appears to be tolerant of the various narratives, it is really
a nod to the status quo. This is because it removes the possibility of criticism of
one narrative over another and therefore undermines any possibility of critical
change.
'9 Some commentators have assumed that if one can speak, one can
participate in the discourse. See, e.g., Post, Public Discourse, supra note 35, at
634. This is clearly not true, however, except in the most formal sense. If one
carries this position to its logical conclusion, it assuredly becomes clear. One can
speak or participate, even in the face of the threat of death. Yet coercion would
destroy any legitimacy to the claim that one is participating or speaking. The
ability to speak does not begin to entail participation in a meaningful sense. A
child and an adult can speak to eacli other, a master to a slave, or an employer
to an employee. For a discussion of what is necessary for participation, see infra
notes 277-83 and accompanying text.
60 The privileging that usually goes on in the debate about racist speech is
often unconscious, sometimes resulting in the loss of the voice of unfavored
narrative. There are times, however, when there is a deliberate effort to privilege
and to silence. For example, there was often an effort to destroy the language
and narrative of Africans subjected to slavery. See EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL,
JORDAN, ROLL 432 (1976).
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B. Pnvileging and the Free Speech/Equality Debate
When examining the legal scholarship and court cases that address the
tension between free speech and equality, one finds that, almost without
exception, the commentator or judge moves to a position of favoring free
speech or equality by using one or more of the forms of privileging
discussed above. There have been a number of important articles written
recently on this subject. The works of Professor Charles R. Lawrence and
Professor Nadine Strossen provide examples of privileging. One of the
reasons to select their work is that, m their respective work and indeed
m their lives, they clearly value both sets of principles.
Professors Lawrence and Strossen attempt a dialogue that would
avoid favoring one set of values over the other. They were asked to
address the issue of racist speech initially at an ACLU Biennial Confer-
ence and to respond to each other's comments. They later expanded upon
their lively exchange in writing. Professor Lawrence's and Professor
Strossen's writings reflect some of the most cogent and subtle articula-
tions of their respective positions. I have learned a great deal from the
insightful and fruitful debate between these two friends of mine. Despite
their efforts, however, I believe that on a number of critical points, each
ends up reflecting the bias of his or her dominant narrative and undermm-
mg an opportunity for real dialogue.61
Professor Lawrence, in If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, begins by making it clear that he values both free
speech and equality 62 He and Professor Strossen would like to avoid the
conflict between these two narratives. The way that each would avoid the
conflict however, the other finds unacceptable.63 Indeed, Lawrence
argues that the most famous equality case should be read as a free speech
case: "Brown [v. Board of Education] held that segregated schools were
unconstitutional primarily because of the message segregation conveys -
the message that black children are an untouchable caste, unfit to be
61 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 33, at 466, 475, 481, Strossen, supra note
32, at 507-23, 541. I hesitate to use Professors Strossen and Lawrence as
examples because I do believe that they have both substantially advanced the
effort to embrace both narratives seriously, without privileging one over the
other. If I am nght that, despite this effort, they slip into privileging one position
over the other, this might suggest not only the difficulty of the effort, but also
that it is a collective process that can only be worked out over time through
committed intellectual and emotional interaction.
62 See Lawrence, supra note 33, at 435.
63 Id. at 474; Strossen, supra note 32, at 491-92.
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educated with white children."'  Lawrence challenges the often-cited
free speech position that there is a clear line between speech and
conduct.65 He argues that racist speech is often one hundred percent
speech and one hundred percent conduct.66 He anticipates that some will
claim that Brown67 is of little value m examining racist speech on
college campuses because, unlike Brown, most of these activities do not
involve a state actor. He describes the public/private distinction as blurred
under the powers of Congress to address racial discrimmation,68 and
attacks this distinction as a monument to preserving American racial
discrimination.69
Professor Lawrence's argument is subtle and powerful. It gains
strength in part from his reformulation of Brown. He adds to the power
of his position by focusing on both the positive goal of Brown of equal
citizenship, and on the effort to eliminate a certain type of harm or
injury He argues that racist speech can be an injury to both the goals of
equality and the goals of free speech. In this part of his discussion, there
is a real elegance and force to Professor Lawrence's movement between
equality concerns and free speech concerns. He appropriates some of the
existing language from the free speech and equality narratives, and
reformulates it. His argument for regulating racist speech is put into the
First Amendment narrative:
The second reason that racial insults should not fall under protected
speech relates to the purpose underlying the first amendment. If the
purpose of the first amendment is to foster the greatest amount of
speech, then racial insults disserve that purpose. Assaultive racist speech
functions as a preemptive strike. The racial invective is experienced as
a blow, not a proffered idea, and once the blow is struck, it is unlikely
64 Lawrence, supra note 33, at 439 (emphasis in original).
65 This skepticism is shared by a number of other commentators. See, e.g.,
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 827 (2d ed. 1988):
The trouble with the distinction between speech and conduct is that it
has less determinate content than is sometimes supposed. All communi-
cations except perhaps that of the extrasensory variety involves
conduct. Expression and conduct, message and medium, are
inextricably tied together m all commumcative behavior; expressive
behavior is "100% action and 100% expression."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
66 See Lawrence, supra note 33, at 444.
67 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
68 Id. at 448-49
69 Id. at 445.
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that dialogue will follow. Racial insults are undeserving of first
amendment protection because the perpetrator's intention is not to
discover truth or initiate dialogue but to injure the victim.
70
The discussion of injury caused by racist speech is one of the most
poignant elements of Professor Lawrence's analysis. Here he also tries to
situate the objection to racist speech within the free speech narrative. It
is when he discusses the injury that regulation may cause to free speech
that he slips into privileging the equality narrative:
Our experience is that the American system of justice has never been
symmetrical where race is concerned. No wonder we see equality as a
precondition to free speech, and we place more weight on that side of
the balance aimed at the removal of the badges and incidents of slavery
71
Whether one agrees with this statement or not, it is clear that it is not
from the narrative of free speech. Although Professor Lawrence
reformulates Brown into a speech case, he subtly moves to trump speech
with equality He argues that it is not only appropriate to balance free
70 Id. at 452. There is one part of the debate that is often repeated regarding
the free speech issue. When there is an effort to regulate or curb speech, there
is an effort to argue that the subject matter is not speech. Of course, if this is
correct, then the difficult question of whether it can be regulated or not is
avoided for First Amendment purposes. It seems to me, however, that this is only
part of the issue. If there is a real conflict between free speech and equality in
constitutional terms, it is not at all clear that, once something is categorized as
speech (even speech that would be protected under the First Amendment), the
discussion is over. It would seem that where there is a real conflict, one cannot
say a pnon that speech wins. This is part of the mistake that the Court made m
Doe v. Umversity of Mich., 721 F Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (A graduate
student at the University of Michigan challenged the constitutionality of the
Umversity's policy on discrinmation and discrimmatoryharassmentof students.).
Of course one cannot say that because there is an injury to equality, equality
must win. Either of these approaches would privilege one narrative over the
other. Many who would privilege their narrative will be alarmed at this position
and see it as radical. The United States Supreme Court, however, has correctly
suggested as much. See FCC v Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747-48 (1978)
(discussing that the constitutional protection a commuication enjoys may vary,
depending on the context of such communication).
71 Lawrence, supra note 33, at 467
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speech and equality, but also that equality must prevail.72 Indeed, he
suggests that this position was the point of Brown. For those who
experience the world from the free speech narrative, it may be too easy
to reject Professor Lawrence's claims.73
Professor Strossen is no less concerned with avoiding a sharp conflict
between free speech and equality She states m the introduction to her
article, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, that
umversities recognize an obligation to protect and promote both free
speech and equal opportunity 74 She tries to avoid an absolutist position
and acknowledges that some of the injuries to which Professor Lawrence
refers could be regulated.75 In fact, Professor Strossen argues that we all
have an obligation to fight racism, and makes it clear that this has been
72 Id. at 466-70. A more recent article suggests that while Professor
Lawrence continues to operate within the egalitarian narrative, his mode of
analysis has shifted to recognize more clearly that a tension between free speech
and equality exists. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Crossburning and the Sound of
Silence: Antisubordination Theory and the First Amendment, 37 VILL. L. REV
787, 798 (1992). He nonetheless continues to essentialize equality- "If we are
truly committed to free speech, First Amendment doctrine and theory must be
guided by the principle of antisubordination. There can be no free speech where
there are still masters and slaves." Id. at 804. Interestingly, this powerful
argument suggests that the only way to dismantle systems of discrimination is
through the regulation of speech. Although speech can perpetuate discrimination,
other structures can do so as well. Professor Lawrence undermines the cogency
of his argument by not acknowledging the role of, for example, the overseer or
the law in enforcing the subordination of enslaved Afican-Amencans. Taking
his argument to its logical extreme compels the conclusion that discrimination
would cease and inequality would vamsh once a master began to speak
respectfully toward his slaves. Experience and history tell us otherwise. In a
paradoxical way, then, Professor Lawrence's argument privileges speech at a
more fundamental level even as it essentializes equality.
7" See, e.g., Post, Racist Speech, supra note 33, at 307 (arguing that
Professor Lawrence does not take seriously the value of free speech). Professor
Robert C. Post is implicitly arguing that Professor Lawrence is privileging
equality. See id. at 313-14. What is interesting is that while Professor Post could
be asking that either position be privileged, he ultimately criticizes only the
privileging of equality His article, while very useful, is much less sensitive to
the value of equality than is Professor Lawrence's piece.
74 Strossen, supra note 32, at 488 (discussing that many universities have
promulgated regulations curbing "hate speech").
75 Id. at 490, 498-506.
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a priority for the ACLU.7 6 She ducks the hard issues, however, by
asserting that the First Amendment does not protect much of the speech
activity about which Professor Lawrence is concerned." The assumption
is, of course, that if it were speech under the First Amendment, it would
not be regulated even if it caused the injuries that Professor Lawrence
chroicles.
In essence, when she addresses some of the specific concerns that are
raised by Professor Lawrence, Professor Strossen writes from a strong
First Amendment narrative. Within that narrative, her arguments are
persuasive, but the balance she wishes to maintain between a concern for
speech and equality is quickly lost. While Professor Lawrence writes
about the injury racist speech can cause, Professor Strossen reduces most
of these injuries to offense.7" This is a normal conflict between the two
stones. Those in the free speech narrative are extremely reluctant to
concede that racist speech is ever any more than offensive, while those
speaking from an equality narrative are more likely to speak of racist
speech as an injury or wound.7 9 Professor Strossen is not entirely
unaware of this problem and unsuccessfully tries to avoid the extreme of
labeling speech as simply offensive. In her analysis, however, she
frequently slips back into this voice of trivializing the harm of racist
76 Id. at 549-54.
77 Id. at 491.
78 See id. at 497 Although Professor Strossen does, at times, acknowledge
the injury speech can cause, she says that type of speech must receive First
Amendment protection. See id. at 539-41.
71 Compare, for example, the characterization of the speech in question m
Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not To Be Spoken To?,
67 Nw U. L. REv 153, 180 (1972) (discussing that individuals are able to reject
unwelcomed commuication in any form) with Richard Delgado, Words that
Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name Calling, 17 HARv
C.R.-C.L. L. REv 133, 143 (1982) [hereinafter Delgado, Words that Wound]
(discussing that mere words, whether racial or otherwise, cause immediate mental
or emotional distress). See also Lawrence,supra note 33, at 461-62 (emphasizing
the distinction between the offensiveness of words and the injury inflicted upon
the targets of those words). Professor Bollinger is one of the few commentators
who tends to embrace the speech narrative but nonetheless acknowledges that
racist speech can do more than offend. See BOLLINGER, supra note 40, at 58-75.
Racist speech can indeed injure. It is also interesting to note how individuals
experience verbal racial attacks. Although numerous people do not necessarily
inhabit the world of categories that legal scholars do, many would object to
calling such attacks only offensive. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 45, at 2327-29
(listing several examples of hate speech and conduct).
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speech as offensive. "The essentials of a Skolae-type setting are that the
offensive speech occurs in a public place Hence the offensive
speech can be either avoided or countered.""
The significance of this labelling can be seen in comparing Professor
Strossen's discussion of Skolae v. National Socialist Party of America8"
with that of Professor Bollinger. Bollinger talks about the speech as
potentially causing substantial harm, not just offense.82
The entire subject of interaction between speakers and listeners is
therefore a matter of considerable complexity We trivialize the
problems speech behavior can pose for any individual or community by
speaking simply of the risk of the speaker's persuading some weaker
minded listeners or of the offense that some listeners will experience.
In this general way, therefore, speech can produce important
harms. This, of course, is clearly revealed when speech is explicitly
insulting or threatening to particular individuals. 3
Professor Bollinger supports the decision m Skokle, while acknowledging
that the injury was greater than merely being offended. He suggests that
the characterization of the speech act as merely offensive, rather than
actually harmful, makes a very difficult decision seem very easy "
Professor Strossen's principal argument against Professor Lawrence's
position is that his proposal would change, cut back, and chill free
speech. She seems unaware that her approach would limit, if not
undermine, equality This oversight is easily made because she argues
from the existing narrative of free speech, with only slight acknowledge-
ment of the value of the equality at the point of conflict.8 5 She is willing
8" Strossen, supra note 32, at 497 But see id. at 539-41 (recognizing that
groups targeted by hate speeches may experience mental or physical harm).
81 Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 366 N.E.2d 347 (Ill. 1977).
82 See, e.g., BOLLINGER, supra note 40, at 58, 65.
83 Id. at 64-65.
14 Id. at 39.
85 Professor Strossen's characterizationof equaliy concerns in a free speech
voice provides a vivid illustration of this privileging: "[E]quality and free speech
go hand n hand. The inportant goal of combating race discrimination, racial
violence, and other forms of discrimination and violence are furthered through
free speech " Nadine Strossen, Liberty, Equality and Democracy: Three
Bases for Reversing the Minnesota Supreme Court's Ruling, 18 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv 965, 967 (1992); see also Nadine Strossen, Regulating Sexual Harass-
ment and Upholding the First Amendment - Avoiding a Collision, 37 VILL. L.
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to afford much value and room for equality, as long as it is not in
conflict with free speech. For example, while Professor Strossen
acknowledges that injury can result from hate speech, she assumes that
if the injury runs up against free speech, the injury must be accepted:
"[s]tatements that defame groups convey opinions or ideas on matters of
public concern, and therefore should be protected even if those statements
also injure reputations or feelings."86 She further states, "there is an
inescapable risk that any hate speech regulation, no matter how narrowly
drawn, will chill speech beyond its literal scope."87 She does not seem
to be aware that if there is a conflict, the way one describes what can be
regulated can have a negative impact on equality
In sum, even when talking about constitutional goals and constraints,
Professors Lawrence and Strossen focus on the Fourteenth Amendment
and the First Amendment, respectively, if the two narratives conflict."8
It is also interesting that they, like most commentators, want to avoid the
most difficult aspect of the problem: how to resolve the tension when
First Amendment protected speech conflicts with the constitutional value
of equality Professor Strossen simply denies that such a conflict exists.
If forced to acknowledge such a conflict, she would choose to privilege
speech. 9 Professor Lawrence would define protected speech so that the
disfavored speech is either outside of First Amendment protection, or
gives way to equality concerns.90
While Professor Strossen argues that Professor Lawrence's proposal
would redefine and injure our current understanding of free speech,
Professor Lawrence argues that Professor Strossen's approach would
restrict our understanding of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
and retard racial equality Who has the burden of drawing the line in the
"appropriate" place and providing the proof that the line will hold? He
or she who has the burden will invariably lose. There is no easy, neutral
REV 757, 781 (1992) (discussing the vital role free speech has played in the
feminist movement).
86 Strossen, supra note 32, at 518.
87 Id. at 521.
88 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 33, at 457-66; Strossen, supra note 32,
at 493-94, 507-49.
89 See Strossen, supra note 32, at 569
90 Lawrence, supra note 33, at 447-49 This is something that a number of
commentators do to avoid the difficult question. One reason why Professor
Lawrence may do tis is because he realizes that there is a tendency to stop the




perspective from which to decide who is right. Each position makes
certain assumptions that privilege its perspective.
A third group of commentators has emerged who are referred to as
the accommodationists. Tus groups tries to move beyond the seemingly
intractable conflict between the libertarians and egalitarians. Professor
Tom M. Massaro's recent article, Equality and Freedom of Expression:
The Hate Speech Dilemma, epitomizes the accommodationist approach.9
Professor Massaro acknowledges the tension between free speech and
equality92 and the importance of context and historical legacies in
effecting the impact of speech, especially on subordinated groups.93
Professor Massaro also understands that words can inflict concrete
injuries.94 For these reasons, she and other accommodatiomsts advocate
the regulation of some hate speech. Professor Massaro succinctly sums up
the nature of such regulation:
The accommodatiomst proposals share the common characteristics of
being tightly worded, context-specific, and closely tied to the fighting
words doctrine and/or the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. In essence, the proposals seek to regulate targeted, intentional
vilification of a person or small group of persons in a face-to-face
encounter on the basis of a protected characteristic. 95
The accommodationists, however, frequently let their concern for
protecting free speech overshadow any concern for equality Professor
Massaro states that although bigotry can cause serious liberty losses, she
is "prepared to avert [her] eyes in order to promote the free and open
discourse ends of the first amendment - at least when the harassment is
a general, purely verbal attack "96 In fact, accommodatiomsts like
Professor Massaro can go almost as far as the libertarians in understating
the depth of the wounds that speech can inflict and the discrimination that
"' See Tom M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate
Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV 211 (1991); see also Post, Racist
Speech, supra note 33, at 270 (discussing how restraints on racist speech turn on
whether they further the university's educational mission rather than their value
in terms of public discourse).
92 See Massaro, supra note 91, at 212.
93 Id. at 254.
94 Id.
9' Id. at 249 (footnotes omitted). Professor Massaro also characterizes it as
the "'fighting words plus' approach." Id.
96 Id. at 254.
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speech can perpetuate. Professor Massaro explains that hate speech that
could be construed as group libel should not be regulated because,
although stereotypes are dehumanizing and reductive, "they are also part
of an ideological framework 9M
Because they typically minimize the extent of speech-induced harm,
the accommodatiorusts frequently lapse into privileging, notwithstanding
their efforts to compromise between the free speech and equality
paradigms.9" Professor Massaro, likewise, frames her entire discussion
in terms of speech despite her attempt to embrace both free speech and
equality values. She begins her discussion with a call for "an appropriate
balance between the strong claims of civil discourse and the strong claims
of untrammeled expression."99 Tus statement, in addition to slanting the
debate in favor of free speech, also reflects a disregard for equality
concerns and a misunderstanding of the concept of incommensurability
By merely seeking "an appropriate balance" between the two conflicting
paradigms, Professor Massaro assumes that common points of reference
cannot be teased out, that the paradigms cannot actually be engaged,
reconceptualized, and evaluated in a dialogical process. ' Thus, she
chooses to remain ensnared in the either/or conceptual trap that induces
further privileging. Instead of finding a principled way to mediate the
tension between free speech and equality, then, she limits her analysis by
moving merely to compromse.'01
9' Id. at 255.
98 Professor Massaro admits that, "the accommodatiomst position is
essentially a civil rights position that works within the existing constitutional
framework." Id. at 251. As R.A. V demonstrates, the constitutional framework,
as it is understood today, usually privileges free speech. See infra notes 309-21
and accompanying text.
In explaining her support for the Stanford policy for speech regulation,
Professor Massaro offers a graphic expression of privileging. "The policy
anticipates that the principal remedy for racist and related forms of verbal
aggression would remain counterspeech, including public-sponsored education
rather than speech suppression." Massaro, supra note 91, at 263.
99 Massaro, supra note 91, at 217 (emphasis added).
"o If Professor Massaro did not make this assumption, she would have at
least spoken about trying to tease out the common points of reference.
101 Professor JUrgen Habermas criticizes such compromising and suggests
that it would be appropriate only when there has been a serious effort to develop
a meaningful understanding between the different positions and that effort has
failed. See generally JORGEN HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTiON
(1984). Notwithstanding this insight, we overvalue the role of compromise and
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Professor Massaro's way of fiaming the debate, much like the
approach used by other accommodationists, is also problematic because
it casts equality concerns in terms of "civil discourse," as if the best that
can be done to address discrmination is to think and speak m a more
"tolerant" narrative. This call for tolerance often has been used to defend
the status quo rather than to challenge existing structures and ways of
thinking that undermine equality The plea for tolerance also implies that
there is no way to truly differentiate between protected and proscribable
speech without being arbitrary Therefore, the insinuation goes, we must
strive for "civility" However, without the substantive grounding that
would come from the discussion-based interaction between and within
narratives, "civility" will prove to be a vacuous goal.
C. Privileging Free Speech in the University
There have not been many cases in which the courts have had to
address the tension between equality and free speech. In the cases where
the tension has arisen, the courts have reproduced the problem of
privilege exhibited in the Strossen/Lawrence articles, without the
sensitivity The analysis m these cases reveals more about how the judges
privilege one framework over the other than about how, in a principled
way, either to select the "correct" framework or to mediate between them.
Doe v. University of Michigan10 2 is one of the first cases that
addresses the issue of the tension between racist speech and equality The
court in Doe quickly moved to privilege the free speech narrative over
the equality narrative. The court appeared to recognize the importance of
both values and expressed concern for the principle of equality, but then
analyzed the case entirely in free speech terms: "It is an unfortunate fact
of our constitutional system that the ideals of freedom and equality are
often in conflict. The difficult and sometimes painful task of our political
and legal institutions is to mediate the appropriate balance between these
two competing values."' 3 While suggesting the need to mediate and
balance the values of equality and free speech, the court in fact did
neither. Instead, it analyzed the case entirely from the free speech
undervalue the effort to develop understanding based on real dialogue because
we often operate as value skeptics.
102 Doev. University of Mich., 721 F Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (InDoe,
a graduate student brought suit challengmg the constitutionality of the Umversity
of Michigan's policy on discrimination and harassment of students.).
103 Id. at 853.
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narrative, without defending its choice of frameworks or suggesting how
to balance the interests."
It is not clear from the decision why the court assumed that the case
could be analyzed with so little regard for equality concerns. Perhaps the
court assumed the equality injury to be mere offensiveness and not a
more substantive harm."0 5 What is clear, however, is that the reasoning
used by the court privileged free speech m this conflict: "While the court
is sympathetic to the University's obligation to ensure equal educational
opportunities for all of its students, such efforts must not be at the
expense of free speech."1 6 Implicit in the court's reasoning is that
racist speech, and indeed injury, can be advanced at the expense of equal
educational opportunity I do not take issue with the judgment in this
case. I do believe, however, that neither the Constitution nor precedent
necessitated pnvileging of free speech mn the court's reasoning. An
analysis that took seriously not only the emotional tug of equality, 1 7 but
also the normative and constitutional value of equality, would have to be
reasoned differently The court, citing Professor Man J. Matsuda,
acknowledged in an addendum to its opinion that there continues to be
a need to address adequately the harm implicated in this case, but it did
not attempt to do so.'08
104 Id. at 863-64.
105 In delineating its overbreadth analysis, the Court stated that regulations
that pumsh "speech or conduct solely on the grounds that they are unseemly or
offensive are unconstitutionally overbroad." Id. at 864. This labeling of the harm
caused by speech as simply "offensive" is typical of the free speech narrative and
fails to acknowledge the notion likely to be employed by the equality narrative,
that the harm in question is more accurately described as the infliction of a
wound.
106 Id. at 868.
107 See, e.g., id. at 869 ("This is not an easy legal or moral puzzle, but it is
precisely in these places where we feel conflicting tugs at heart and mind.").
108 Id. (citing Matsuda, supra note 45). The real substantive flaw that the
court found in the speech code was overbreadth. In its statement of the
overbreadth case law, none of the cases that it cited involved a conflict between
speech and equality. The use of this concept in free speech analysis decisively
privileges free speech over equality, since it measures the legitimate scope of the
regulation by examining the degree to which it includes protected speech, without
regard to its relation to equality. This is not to say that the use of the overbreadth
doctrine must privilege free speech, but rather that it will, where a regulation's
consequences for equality are not added into the balance.
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In the same year that Doe was decided, the University of Wisconsin,
in response to a series of racist and discriminatory activity, passed a
speech code. The code prohibited the utterance of epithets that would
demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation,
national origin, ancestry, or age of an individual or individuals and create
an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for education."0 9
The code was challenged as a violation of the First Amendment in U-M
Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents." In finding that the code violated the
First Amendment, the court employed the free speech narrative and was
even more dismissive of equality concerns than the Doe court. Because
the court did not recognize the importance or the validity of equality
concerns, it proceeded to analyze the case entirely from the free speech
narrative. The court's speech analysis had two components: application
of the "fighting words" doctrine and application of the balancing test
articulated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire."' The application of the
fighting words doctrine, of course, contains its own conclusion in this
context. The court stated that "[i]t is unlikely that all or nearly all
demeaning, discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive
behavior which creates an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment
tends to provoke a violent response.""' 2 Consequently, some speech
regulated by the code is not reached by the "fighting words" doctrine. For
this reason, the court found the code unconstitutionally overbroad." 3
An important aspect of this manifestation of the free speech narrative
is the narrow concept of harm that it uses. The only kind of harm that the
"fighting words" doctrine recognizes is physical violence in response to
speech. Tins doctrine decisively privileges the free speech narrative over
the equality narrative, which is concerned with discrimination and harm
to equal educational opportunity No requirement that the discrimination
be accompanied by physical harm exists. Indeed, the United States
In any case, one need not hypothesize about whether the court privileged
free speech over equality In its conclusion, the court stated with an air of
determlnsm that "[w]hile the court is sympathetic to the University's obligation
to ensure equal educational opportunities for all of its students, such efforts must
not be at the expense of free speech." Id. at 868. It is difficult to imagme a more
global privilegmg of free speech over equality.
109 UWM Post, Inc. v Board of Regents, 774 F Supp 1163, 1165 (E.D. Wis.
1991).
110 Id.
i. Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).




Supreme Court expressly rejected this approach in Brown when it
overturned Plessy v. Ferguson. 14 Thus, within the free speech narrative
generally, and the "fighting words" narrative in particular, the claims of
equality with regard to harm cannot be heard. The court in UWM refused
to recognize psychological harm. It is worth noting, as argued below, that
the harm the free speech narrative seeks to avoid is itself a psychic
harm."
5
In the second part of its analysis, the court found that the Chaplinsky
balancing test did not apply to the conflict at issue, and concluded that
even if it had applied, the code would be rendered unconstitutional. After
the court stated that the Chaplinsky balancing test applies only to content-
neutral regulations of speech, it essentially asserted that the code was a
content-based regulation. The court noted that "[t]he rule disciplines
students whose comments, epithets or other expressive behavior demeans
their addressees' race, sex, religion, etc."'" 6 and "leaves unregulated
comments, epithets or other expressive behavior which [do not].""' 7 For
this reason, the court found it to be clear that "the UW Rule regulates
speech based on its content.""' This reasoning privileges the free
speech narrative by ending its analysis with the finding that a particular
kind of speech is prohibited, and assumes that this is synonymous with
a content-based regulation. The court could have gone a step further and
mquired into the purpose of the regulation of certain kinds of speech, in
order to see if it reflected not a hostility toward the ideas expressed, but
rather a pursuit of some legitimate objective based on the impact of the
speech in a particular context. For example, the court could have found
that the university wanted to eradicate impediments to the provision of an
equal education to groups who have been historically denied educational
opportunity, and to end discrimination proscribed by Title VII, and that
the code was a content-neutral regulation directed toward that end." 9
"4 Brownv. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493-94 (1954) (overrulingPlessy
v Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)); see Lawrence, supra note 33, at 462.
'" See znfra notes 225-57 and accompanying text.
116 UW, 774 F Supp. at 1174.
117 Id.
118 Id.
"9 Tis is precisely the kind of analysis that the court m Robinson v
Jacksonville Slipyards, Inc., 760 F Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (rejecting
"social context" argument as pre-existing atmosphere deterring female employ-
ment was contemplated by Title VII), employed in the workplace context. See
Barnes v Glen Theatre Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 570 (1991) (holding that local
statutes requiring nude dancers to wear pasties and g-strings did not violate the
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The court casually dismissed each claim the university raised, staying
comfortably situated in a framework that was apparently self-evidently
correct to the court. When the university raised the Fourteenth Amend-
ment interest, the court failed to consider such a conflict seriously The
court asserted that the university had not shown that equal educational
opportunity was being affected, and, even if it were, that there was no
state action. 2 ° Although educational discrimination under Title VI does
reach private discrimination, it is clear that this court would fail to
address the issue seriously 121
Although I am primarily concerned here with privileging when free
speech and equality are involved, it is worth noting that the problem is
much broader. For example, while the courts in Doe and UWM easily
dismissed equality and educational concerns in favor of free speech, the
Court in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,12 however, just as
easily dismissed free speech concerns without any of the lofty language
about the pre-eminence of expression. In Hazelwood, a school refused to
allow the student newspaper to publish an article concerning the
pregnancy experiences of three of the school students. The Court accepted
a number of values, including the pedagogical interest of shielding the
high school audience from objectionable viewpoints and sensitive topics
as outweighing the free speech interest. The Court framed the issue to
produce the desired outcome: "It is only when the decision to censor a
school-sponsored publication, theatrical production, or other vehicle of
student expression has no valid educational purpose that the First
Amendment is so directly and sharply implicated as to require
judicial intervention.""12 Justice Whites's majority opinion acknowledg-
First Amendment despite limitations on expressive activity).
120 UW, 774 F Supp. at 1176.
121 When the claim was made that the discrimination was like Title VII, the
court asserted that the university is not like a workplace, and, even if it were, a
statute would have to give way to the Constitution. See id. at 1177 Tis is
clearly not an adequate analysis of this issue. Title VII and Title VI were passed
pursuant to constitutional power given to Congress. At least one Supreme Court
case has held that Title VI and the Fourteenth Amendment are coterminous. See
Lau v Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
In a series of cases where there has been a conflict between First Amend-
ment rights of association and the prohibition against discrimination, the Supreme
Court has found that First Amendment interests must yield to the constitutional
interest of anti-discrimnation. See infra notes 169-211 and accompanying text.
122 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
's Id. at 273 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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es that there are competing interests m free expression of the students and
educational purpose of the school, but he states that any educational
purpose will outweigh the free expression interests." Justice White
does not inform us why tlus is true. The school's defense only asserted
that the students' expression would interfere with the educational
functioning of the school. Yet in URr, the court stated that the school
had not proved that racist speech would interfere with equal educational
opportunity "2 This proof was not required m Hazelwood.
D. Privileging Equality in the Workplace
In the context of employment, a federal court in Florida expressed a
radically different view from that of the Doe and UJM courts about the
conflict between free speech and equality In contrast with the two speech
code cases described above, the court in Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc.'26 addressed a conflict between free speech and equality
within the equality narrative by framing the issue as a Title VII case.'27
At issue in Robinson was a claim that the pervasive posting of pictures
of nude women and ongoing sexual verbal harassment by male employees
created a hostile work environment for women. One of the elements of
the hostile environment claim is the impact of the harassing behavior on
the employee and the work environment. According to the court, the
analysis of this element must seek to separate the "mere utterance of
[a discriminatory] epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an
employee " from conduct that violates Title VII.12s In articulating
the test for a hostile environment claim, the court stated that the
harassment "must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter conditions
of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment."" 29 Specifically, the question is whether the "harassment was
sufficiently severe or persistent 'to affect seriously [the victim's]
124 id.
125 UW, 774 F Supp. at 1176.
126 Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
127 Title VII, with its roots in the principles of equality articulated in the
Fourteenth Amendment, has provided a structure for recognizing psychic harm
as substantial and legally actionable.
128 Robinson, 760 F Supp. at 1523 (quoting Rogers v EEOC, 454 F.2d 234,
238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)).
The court in Robinson uses the terms "conduct" and "harassing speech"
interchangeably.
129 Id. (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
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psychological well being.'" 3 Thus, unlike in the speech code cases,
the court employed a broad conception of harn which included psychic
suffering. In addition, the court focused on the impact of the speech
instead of the content.
Like the courts in the speech code cases, the Robinson court
addressed a privilege. In this case, however, the court privileged the
equality narrative by analyzing free speech claims only superficially This
privileging occurred in several ways. First, the court argued that "the
pictures and verbal harassment are not protected speech because they act
as discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile work environ-
ment.'' This is precisely the converse of the per se rule in favor of
free speech as stated in Doe.
Second, the court argued that "the regulation of discriminatory speech
in the workplace constitutes nothing more than a time, place, and manner
regulation of speech."'3 In order to find that the requisite content-
neutrality and compelling state interest existed, the court employed the
equality narrative. The court stated that the eradication of discrimination
in employment furthers the compelling governmental interest of
eliminating economic, political, and social barriers that hinder wom-
en.'33 By viewing the advancement of the equality of women and the
elimination of discrimination, rather than censorship, as the core
concerns, the court could view an injunction-induced regulation of speech
as satisfying the content-neutrality requirement. 3 4 This is precisely the
converse of the reading of content-neutrality that the court in UWM
articulated from its speech privileging perspective.
While the Robinson court did acknowledge some possibility of a
content-neutrality problem, it found this issue mimmal compared with the
compelling need to overcome discrimmation: "To the extent that the
regulation here does not seem entirely content neutral, the distinction
based on the sexually explicit nature of the pictures and other speech does
not offend constitutional principles.'
' 35
In its most categorical privileging of equality over speech, the court
argued that even if the speech were recognized as protected, it would
130 Id. (quoting Sparks v Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1561
(llth Cir. 1987)).
131 Id. at 1535.
132 Id.





have to yield to the compelling interest of "cleansing the workplace of
the impediments to the equality of women. ' '136 Thus, in its analysis of
a conflict between protected speech and equality, it acknowledged little
harm to free speech principles, and instead focused exclusively on the
harm resulting from inequality This leads to the conclusion that m a
conflict between speech and equality, equality must prevail.
The United States Supreme Court also privileged equality in a recent
case brought by a female employee in response to frequent gender-based
epithets and sexual innuendos directed at her by her employer's president.
In Hams v. Forldift Systems, Inc.,' the Court addressed the issue of
whether conduct, to be actionable as "abusive work environment"
harassment, must seriously affect an employee's psychological well-being
or cause an injury 3 The Court described the standard to be applied as
"a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely
offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological
injury 1)139 In concrete terms, this standard means that if an employee
objectively, in accordance with the reasonable person, and subjectively,
in accordance with the actual person, perceives the work environment as
hostile or abusive, the conduct is actionable.'
41
The Court determined that the supervisor's behavior created an
objectively and subjectively hostile environment, but did so without
addressing the tension between free speech and equality in the context of
the workplace. 4' In fact, the Court did not even mention free speech
concerns in the opinion. 142 Whereas in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,
143
the First Amendment constituted the major hurdle, in Hams, the
Fourteenth Amendment via Title VII is used as the Archimedean Point
136 Id. at 1536.
1 Hams v Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
I38 d. at 21.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 21-22.
14, The Court's reference throughout to the harasser as being liable for ls
conduct provides the most concrete manifestation of this. The Court uses conduct
even though much of the harassment consisted of hostile comments, in other
words, speech: "[w]e need a man as the rental manager"; "dumb ass woman";
and "[let's] go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [your] raise." Id. at 19.
By couching the decision in terms of conduct, the Court tries to forestall the
looming conflict between the regulation of sexually harassing speech and the
demand for unfettered expression.
142 Id. at 21-23.
143 R.A.V v City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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by which conflicts are assessed and judged."' The Court's method of
reasoning, therefore, privileges equality In all of these cases, then, the
courts take a difficult problem and make it much too simple. They do this
by trivializing the disfavored narrative, while placing great weight on the
favored narrative. It is not so much that the decisions are wrong, as that
we do not know what supports these decisions other than the power of
the judge to advance his or her favored story Indeed, unless we develop
a more principled way of addressing these issues, we may not be able to
discern what is right or wrong.
II. UNDERLYNG VALUES
In Part I, I suggested that free speech and equality are two different
narratives which may be incommensurable. 4 I have also indicated that
most of the debate about issues of increasing racism on college campuses
and the response of limits on racist speech has not been a real dialogue
but a series of monologues, each privileging one narrative over the other.
If the tension between these two prnciples is to be mediated in a
prncipled way, there must first be an adequate understanding of the
values underlying each.
In addition to tensions between the two narratives, there are also
internal tensions within each narrative. There is a serious question of
whether there is an adequate theory of either free speech or equality
Certainly the current theories do not adequately address either the
external or the internal tensions. This failure becomes clear when one
examines the underlying values and how they interact with each other.
A. Values Underlying Free Speech
No less of a free speech proponent than Professor Thomas I. Emerson
has noted that the effort to develop an adequate theory of free speech has
not been successful. "Proponents of the 'absolute' or 'literal' interpre-
tation of the first amendment have failed." '146 This failure to articulate
a workable general theory, according to Professor Emerson, not only
creates confusion, but threatens the "disintegration" of free speech.'47
44 Hams, 505 U.S. at 21-23.
145 See supra notes 16-144 and accompanying text.
146 Emerson, supra note 21, at 877
147 Id. Professor Emerson took on the task of developing such a theory and
has greatly advanced our understanding of free speech. His theory, however, also
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Professor Emerson takes on the task of trying to bring coherence to
the theory of the First Amendment. He starts by setting out and defending
what he sees as the critical values underlying it. The four principal values
that are on his list are as follows: (1) individual self-fulfillment and self-
realization, (2) truth finding, (3) participation in decision-making, and (4)
balance between stability and change.4 8 Professor Emerson sees some
of these values, such as self-fulfillment, as primarily individual or liberty
values, while he sees others, such as truth finding, as mostly a social
value. 149 He suggests that participation is both a social and a liberty
interest.150 Professor Emerson sees the participation value of free speech
as being closely tied to autonomy and to the legitimacy of democracy
He, therefore, asserts that all must have an equal right to participate.'
Professor C. Edwin Baker reformulates and refines Professor
Emerson's set of values underpinning the First Amendment, suggesting
that there are really only two core values: individual self-fulfillment and
participation.'52 Professor Baker describes his perspective as follows:
"Emerson's second and fourth values are derivative. Given that truth is
chosen or created, not discovered, advancement of knowledge and
discovery of truth are merely aspects of participation in change."' 53
Professor Baker does not try to defend in the abstract the values he
lists but claims instead that m our constitutional democracy, certain
continues to be criticized as incomplete and incoherent. See, e.g., BAKER, supra
note 21, at 47-50, 70-73; BOLLINGER, supra note 40, at 43-103.
148 See Emerson, supra note 21, at 878-79.
' Professor Kent Greenawaltmakes asmilar distinction. He calls social liberties
consequential justification for free speech and individual liberty non-consequential
bases for free speech. See Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM.
L. REv 119, 127 (1989) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Free Speech].
"' See Emerson, supra note 21, at 882. When Professor Emerson and others
talk about participation, even as an individual interest, they are still not focusing
on the constitutive nature of participation. Instead, they are more concernedwith
the autonomy issue: that an autonomous person should only obey the laws that
she had a right to participate in creating.
... Professor Emerson's notion of participation, like that of most traditional
free speech advocates, is formal. As long as one is not physically restrained from
participating, his requirement for participationis met. Professor Frank Michelman
is critical of tis formalist view of participation and has put forth an alternative,
substantive view. See Frank Michelman, Universities, Racist Speech and
Democracy in America: An Essay for the ACLU, 27 HARv C.R.-C.L. L. REv
339, 345-53 (1992).
152 See BAKER, supra note 21, at 47
153 Id. at 48.
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values are entailed, including equality and autonomy for all citizens." 4
He recognizes that there can be conflict between free speech values,
particularly the social value of participation and the liberty value of self-
fulfillment.'55 He would resolve tis conflict by giving primacy to the
liberty value, as opposed to the social value, of free speech. 6 This,
however, only pushes the tension to another level; it does not resolve it.
Professor Baker also recognizes that there are a number of different
locations for free speech interests, as well as different values. He lists the
rights of the listener, audience, and bystander, in addition to the rights of
the speaker.'57 It might be more accurate to describe tins constellation
of interests as commumcation rights. Just as there can be tension between
the different values there can also be tension between the groups.
Some commentators would make the social value of free speech
primary to the liberty value to resolve tis tension,'58 but thns only
suggests a new tension. "'59 The right to say whatever one chooses can
compromise the ability of the group to cohere in order to constitute itself
and society The speech of an individual can compromise the rights of the
listener. 60 To limit the speaker, however, can threaten her autonomy
and self-development. Professor Robert C. Post believes that this tension
cannot ultimately be resolved. 6' There is also disagreement among
154 Id. at 50. Autonomy and equality are what Professor Baker would use as
guides to limit speech. He does not recognize the right to use speech to
undermine another's autonomy, even though he asserts that speech must be
allowed to harm. Id. at 58.
... Professor Baker, however, mistakenly views free speech and autonomy as
atomistic. See id. at 47
156 Id. at 22-24.
'57 Id. at 67-69; see also Greenawalt,Free Speech, supra note 149, at 143-48.
158 SeeALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION-
AL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 55-56 (1965) (calling the First Amendment the
"cornerstone of the structures of self-government"); BOLLINGER, supra note 40,
at 43-75.
,' See generally BAKER, supra note 21, BOLLINGER, supra note 40;
Emerson, supra note 21, Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They
Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REv 287 (1990) [hereinafter Greenawalt,
Insults and Epithets].
160 Post, Racist Speech, supra note 33, at 273-74.
161 Id. at 289. Although Professor Post recognizes tins important tension, he
also trivializes it. He discusses the tension in terms of individual rights versus
civility. Id. at 285-90. Characterizing the issue as a matter of civility, however,
undermines what is at stake. Hate speech is not merely something "not nice." Put
another way, what destroys people's option to participate collectively and to
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theorists about whether the different values of protected speech are of
equal importance. Some argue that the essence of free speech is social,
political speech. 62 Others insist that it is the liberty right of the mdivid-
ual.' 63 Some believe that it depends on the context.1" Still others be-
lieve that the most important right of free speech is the right of willing
listeners to hear. These commentators believe speech is about commum-
cation and is relational. 65 Theorists who recognize that speech wich
undermines autonomy or coerces can normally be regulated, however,
have not been clear about why racist speech cannot be regulated based on
this rationale.
66
None of the traditional theories on free speech have managed to
resolve these internal tensions. 67 Usually these tensions are just ig-
nored. To understand the dangers of an attack on free speech as well as
its defense, one must be clear about the underlying values that are at risk
and to whom. For example, how should this tension be addressed when
the social speech value of the speaker interferes with the liberty value of
the listener9 Regardless of which value is made primary, there remains
an internal tension within free speech that is especially relevant to our
approach to racist speech.
constitute themselves is not sunply incivility. Yet Professor Post and other free
speech proponents cling to this view of racist speech as uncivil, enabling them
to resolve the tension in favor of free speech. The problem with this perspective
is that it looks at only at legal constraints and not also at experiential constraints
on the right to participate. See Michelman, supra note 151, at 350-53.
162 See, e.g., BOLLINGER, supra note 40, at 46.
163 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 21, at 47-51.
'64 See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF
LANGUAGE 14 (1989) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, SPEECH] (recognizing that, in
some contexts, free speech is right or wrong, depending on the consequences,
while in others, it is right or wrong regardless of the consequences).
161 Professor Baker notes that we need to protect solitary speech. But see
BAKER, supra note 21, at 51, 54 (arguing for constitutional protection of the
freedom of speech based on the liberty theory). Even tls speech, however, is
relational. When one exists in a language, one is always in a relationship in time
and space with a community of seekers.
166 Professor Baker, for example, would expressly allow speech that coerces
and undermines autonomy to be prohibited; but he then goes on to state that
racist speech should not be regulated. One can only assume that Professor Baker
fails to understand that racist speech does, in fact, often coerce and undermine
autonomy.




Most of the theories and rights that are associated with speech have
been shown to be problematic, not only from the equality narrative, but
within the speech narrative itself 68 How one addresses these internal
tensions will be, in part, determined by one's normative concept of
society and the individual, about which there are many views.
B. Values Underlying Equality
Our constitutional theory of equality is even less adequately
developed than our free speech theory 169 In fact, one commentator has
16 See BAKER, supra note 21, at 1-46; BOLLINGER, supra note 40, at 43-103.
Professor Bollinger argues that most of the justifications supporting free speech
are incoherent and do not unequivocally support the proposition for which they
are cited. Professor Baker attacks the marketplace of ideas theory that has been
important in the development of the classical model for free speech. Professor
Bollinger systematically addresses the underlying themes of free speech In the
classical model and shows how they are flawed and how they fail to account for
the current position on hate speech. He then offers an alternative that has not
fared any better than the classical model he attacked. See, e.g., Paul Brest, How
Free Do We Want To Be? (book review of Bollinger's THE TOLERANT
SOCIETY), N.Y TIMES, June 8, 1986, § 7, at 21 (criticizing Bollinger for
advocating a "conscientiously ambiguous" doctrine allowing the courts to
examine all of the relevant factors); David A. Strauss, Why Be Tolerant?, 53 U.
CHI. L. REv 1485 (1986) (book review) (disagreeing with Bollinger's classical
defense of free speech in THE TOLERANT SOCIETY). For a complete list of
reviews of Professor Bollinger's work, see Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant
Society: A Response to Critics, 90 COLUM. L. REv 979 app. (1990). The two
values that Professor Baker identifies as being First Amendment values are self-
expression and participation. Unrestrained self-expression, however, can destroy
the conditions for participation. Professor Post addresses this problem without
finding a solution. See Post, Racist Speech, supra note 33, at 302-11.
169 Our theory of equality within the constitutional legal context is especially
thin. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF 107, 176-77 (1976) ("[W]e should become increasingly aware of the
role ofjudicial pronouncement in translating the ideal of equality, the nature of
the choices the courts have made, and the explanation for the choices."). Cf. john
a. powell, Racial Realism or Racial Despair?, 24 CONN. L. REv 533, 536
(1992) ("Whether substantive equality can serve a legitimate role in rights
protection is an Important question that must be addressed before 'equality' is
summarily rejected."). In this Article, I argue for a richer, more substantive
theory of equality. See also TRiBE, supra note 65, at 1436-1687 ("The central
concept of the clause, equality, requires the specification of substantive values
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suggested that equality is an empty concept without which we could do
just as well. 7 ' The development of an adequate theory of equality has
suffered the double problem of conceptual difficulty and political
resistance. Our concept of equality has been animated by a pull for
universal participation and meamngful democracy, yet limited by the
reality of slavery and racial, gender, and class subordination. It may be
that the political problems are largely responsible for our inadequate
efforts in the conceptual area. Although the founders of this country
appreciated the importance of the concept of equality, it took almost one
hundred years and one of the bloodiest wars m this country's history
before the concept was written into our Constitution.' Almost before
the ink had dried, the Court moved to make the constitutional meaning
of equality, at best, Irrelevant and, at worst, part of the system that would
be used to legitimatize the subordination of blacks in America.'72
Justice Marshall, in his Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke'73 dissent, expressed frustration at the Court's and the country's
failure to develop an adequate theory of equality-
I fear that we have come full circle. After the Civil War, our govern-
ment started several "affirmative action" programs. This Court m the
Civil Rights Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson destroyed the movement
toward complete equality. For almost a century no action was taken, and
this nonaction was with the tacit approval of the courts. Then we had
Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Acts of Congress,
followed by numerous affirmative-action programs. Now, we have tis
Court again stepping in, this time to stop affirmative-action programs
of the type used by the Umversity of California.'74
What equality means and should mean continues to be one of the
most controversial and important issues in our society The practice of
slavery and racism distorted and continues to distort the development of
before it has full meaning." Id. at 1514.); Kimberl6 W Crenshaw, Race, Reform
andRetrenchment: Transformation andLegitimation in Anti-discnmination Law,
101 HARV L. REv 1331, 1384 (1988) (critiquing "society's embraceof formal
equality").
170 See Westen, supra note 39, at 542.
171 DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 125 (1987).
172 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
1 Regents of the Umv. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
174 Id. at 402 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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equality as a normative value in our society " It is this history that
gives passing plausibility to Justice Holmes's statement that the Four-
teenth Amendment argument is an argument of last resort, 176 to Profes-
sor Demck Bell's position that we should drop the use of equality,
177
and to Professor Peter Westen's claim that equality is meaningless and
empty 178
In reality, equality has not lost all currency in our society; rather,
only the formal equality used by the Court and proponents of racial
hierarchy has been repudiated. 179 Equality must be contextualized and
substantively based.18 Equality in the abstract, as with all concepts in
the abstract, has very little meaning and very little value. As Professor
Baker has noted: "Equal protection must have substantive content. That
much should be settled by the failure of all attempts to develop a
coherent approach to the clause based entirely on process, rationality, or
representation reinforcing considerations. The Supreme Court's decisions
and the commentators' recommendations inevitably imply underlying
substantive value commitments."'' Professor Laurence Tribe shares a
,71 See BELL, supra note 171, at 45-48, 122 (discussing the effects of slavery
and racism on the economic and social well-being of Afican-Amencans).
176 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
177 Demck Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV 363, 377 (1992).
Professor Bell's attack on equality is primarily an attack on formal equality, not
substantive equality. For a rejoinder to Bell's position, see powell, supra note
169.
178 Westen, supra note 39, at 547 To the extent that equality is only
perceivedas formal, much of Professor Westen's and Professor Bell's arguments
have force. However, as a number of commentators have argued, equality, as
conceived of in the Fourteenth Amendment, is clearly substantive in nature. See
BAKER, supra note 21, at 41-42 (suggesting that although equality does not
require a specific level of substantive equality, it must make "equality of
auditions as a meritorious policy goal"); KARsT, supra note 22, at 10 ("In the
America where we live, equality matters - a culturally specific and evolving
cluster of substantive values, solidly based in a particular society's traditions.
Equality, in the abstract, may be value-neutral; the Fourteenth Amendment is
not.").
,' By formal equality, I refer to all the efforts to make equality an abstract
concept of symmetry, including color blindness, anti-differentiation, and anti-
discrimination modes. Although anti-subordination avoids the empty notion of
equality that can be used to advance the domination of minority groups, it also
seems to be incomplete.
i See Crenshaw, supra note 169, at 1384.
181 C. Edwin Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The
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similar perspective. In writing about the meaning of the Equality Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, he observes the following: "The central
concept of the clause, equality, requires the specification of substantive
values before it has full meaning. Not even those committed to
Justice Black's strict textual approach to the Constitution could make
much sense of the equal protection clause standing alone."' 82
Professor Catherine A. MacKinnon also argues for the adoption of a
more meaningful and contextually sensitive conception of equality 183
In her view, American jurisprudence continues to define inequality as
difference or differentiation, regardless of whether it is powerful or
powerless groups that are being helped or hurt.'84 By extension, she
asserts, equality continues to be viewed in a formal rather than a
substantive sense. 8' Rigid neutrality, even if it reinforces or proscribes
the elimination of social inequality, is consequently mistaken to be
equality '
86
Professor MacKinnon cites two cases ruled on by the Canadian
Supreme Court'87 to illustrate the adoption of a more helpful notion of
equality- "[a notion] directed toward changing unequal social relations
rather than monitoring their equal positioning before the law "'88 She
asserts that American courts and policy-makers should follow the
Canadian Supreme Court's lead by begiunung to view, for example,
pornography and hate speech regulations as laws "passed to stand behind
a comparatively powerless group in its social fight for equality against
socially powerful and exploitative groups. ' 89
Professor MacKinnon sums up how she thinks equality should be
understood, promoted, and protected in America:
Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV 933 (1983)
(footnotes omitted).
182 TRIBE, supra note 65, at 1514.
183 CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WoRDs 85-91 (1993).
184 Id. at 98.
185 Id.
186 id.
187 The Queen v Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (upholding, on equality
grounds, a law forbidding the willful promotion of hate propaganda against
identifiable groups); The Queen v Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (upholding, on
sex equality grounds, a Canadian law because of the potential harm to women
and society as a whole).




In this new model, principle will be defined in terms of specific
experiences, the particularity of history, substantively rather than
abstractly. It will notice who is being hurt and never forget who they
are. The state will have as great a role in providing relief from injury
to equality through speech and in giving equal access to speech as it
now has in disciplining its power to intervene in that speech that
manages to get expressed.1 90
A number of Critical Race Theorists have also articulated a substan-
tive notion of equality 191 Professor KimberlM W Crenshaw, for m-
stance, calls for a more contextualized understanding of equality while
critiquing the prevailing formalistic view-
With society's embrace of formal equality came the eradication of
symbolic domination The removal of formal barriers, although
symbolically significant to all and materially significant to some, will
do little to alter the hierarchical relationship between Blacks and whites
until the way in which white race consciousness perpetuates norms that
legitimate Black subordination is revealed. [T]he belief that racial
exclusion is illegitimate only where the "White Only" signs are explicit
makes it difficult to move the discussion of racism beyond the
190 Id. at 109.
191 See Crenshaw, supra note 169, at 1384 ("The removal of formal barriers,
although symbolically significant will do little to alter the nerarclnal
relationship between Blacks and Whites "); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our
Constitution Is Color-Blind"' 44 STAN. L. REV 1, 68 (1991) (discussing the
danger of courts focusing on formal race rather than the "reality of racial
subordination"); Man J. Matsuda, Voices ofAmerica: Accent, Antidiscrimination
Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329,
1392-96 (1991) (rejecting the "rigid" formalistic approach to accent discrimina-
tion in favor of antisubordination); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 758, 758 (supporting the critical race's perspective of race consciousness that
"one's position in the structure of race relations makes a qualitative difference
in how one sees and experiences the world"); Lawrence, supra note 33, at 459
("Until we have eradicated racism and sexism and no longer share in the fruits
of those forms of domination, we cannotjustly strike the balance over the protest
of those who are dominated.");john a. powell, The New PropertyDisaggregated:
A Model to Address Employment Discrimination, 24 U.S.F L. REV 363, 382
(1990) (arguing that adoption of a formal notion of equality would "marginalize




societal self-satisfaction engendered by the appearance of neutral norms
and formal inclusion. 92
Likewise, Professor Neil Gotanda asserts that a substantive notion of
equality must be embraced if subordination is to be addressed. 193
Without a contextualized conception of equality, "the Court nsks
establishing a new equivalent of Plessy v. Ferguson."'94 Professor
Gotanda concludes that formal equality, as manifested by the color blind
concept, "is inadequate to deal with today's racially stratified, cul-
turally diverse, and economically divided nation." 95 Moreover, so
long as the United States Supreme Court embraces formal equality, it
risks "losing legitimacy and relevance in a crucial area of social
concern."
196
While the Court at times appears to have finally recognized that
equality must have substantive content, there remains a push for the
concept of formal equality This continued push is neither coherent nor
neutral.' 97 When the formal conceptualization has prevailed, racial
minorities have tended to be subjugated in the name of equality For
example, the Supreme Court reasoned in Plessy v. Ferguson98 that
because there was symmetry - that blacks could not ride in a white rail
car and whites would not ride in a black rail car - this was consistent
with the requirement of equality under the Fourteenth Amendment. 199
192 Crenshaw, supra note 169, at 1384.
193 Gotanda, supra note 191, at 68.
194 Id. at 67
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 See Roy L. Brooks, Racial Subordination Through Formal Equal
Opportunity, 25 SAN DIGO L. REV 879, at 883-85 (1988) ("Too often formal
equal opportunity subordinates each class within Black society, and this
subordination fuels the American race problems." Id. at 884.).
198 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
199 Id. A more recent example of our using formalism to slam the door on
minority aspirations is City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989) (holding that the city's award of public contracts using race as the "sole
critenon"violates the FourteenthAmendment). The Bush Adminstration has also
used formal equality and color blindness to oppose the 1990 Civil Rights Act and
minority scholarships. See Steven A. Holmes, President Vetoes Bill on Job
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1990, at Al, col. 4 (discussing the President's veto
of the job protection measure because it would "'introduce the destructive force
of quotas into our national employment system"').
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Similarly, in Palmer v. Thompson,"' the Court twisted the interest of
blacks in integrating a swnimnmg pool. Rather than integrate the pool, the
city closed it. Using the concept of formal equality, the Court found that
the city's action did not violate equality, because blacks and whites alike
were demed use of the pool.2"' Justice White chided the Court for
accepting this formal approach to equality, noting that its real message
and intent was to maintain racial hierarchy 2 02 By closing the pool, the
city inflicted a further injury of stigma and perpetuated a badge of
inferiority 
203
The Court, however, has also recognized the need for substantive
content to the Fourteenth Amendment. In defending its laws against
interracial mamage, the Commonwealth of Virginia argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment only required that blacks and whites be treated
equally 24 Adopting the formal equality analysis of Plessy, the state
reasoned that, since the law applied equally to blacks and whites, it was
not constitutionally infirm.205 The Umted States Supreme Court rejected
this notion and instead found that there is a substantive content to the
Fourteenth Amendment that goes beyond the formal question of whether
blacks and whites are being treated equally 206 In Plyler v. Doe,207 the
Court noted that one of the substantive purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment is to abolish "class and caste" treatment.2 8 Of course in
Brown itself, the Court, in overturning Plessy, rejected the false notion of
equality requiring only symmetry 219 In the last decade or so, however,
the Court has begun to move back to a formal conception of equality
From a normative standpoint, such a shift cannot be justified. Moreover,
whenever the Court has embraced this formal notion, people of color had
to bear the adverse consequences.2"0
200 Palmer v Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
201 Id. at 220.
202 Id. at 266-67 (White, J., dissenting).
203 Id.
204 Loving v Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Plyler v Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
208 Id. at 216-17 n.14.
209 Brown v Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-94 (1954).
210 Such a notion of equality undermines racialjustice. When the majority of
the Court has embraced the concept of color blindness - one expression of
formal equality - people of color typically have lost. john a. powell, An Agenda
for the Post-Civil Rights Era, 29 U.S.F L. REv 879, 893 (1995).
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An adequate concept of equality, therefore, must encompass more
than color blindness, procedural equality, and even anti-discrimma-
tion.' It must advance equal digmty - the right to be free of domma-
tion and subordination. The concept of equality must also accord with
what is necessary for membership and equal participation in critical
institutions m the real world that we inhabit.
C. Harm in the Free Speech Narrative
While the courts and commentators have been mindful of the
potential harm that equality can cause if not adequately limited, similar
attention has not been paid to the harm that speech can cause.2" 2
Indeed, part of the reluctance by the courts to define aggressively a
substantive content of equality seems to stem from the concern that it
might produce undesirable harms.2"3 If one is to consider adequately if
and when speech should be prohibited, one must consider the harms that
speech can cause. The claim that is often made - that speech does not
cause real harm, or that the harm it causes is substantially different from
non-speech harm - simply does not hold. The msistence that speech
causes little or no harm, however, has played a central role in construc-
tion of the "fortress" surrounding free speech. Because this error in our
view of speech harms is partially grounded in our concept of liberties, we
must consider how our view of speech-induced harm has developed.
211 See MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE 36 (1991)
(on the limit of anti-discrimination as a mediating principle for the Fourteenth
Amendment); TRIBE, supra note 65, at 1436-1687 (suggesting that an antisubju-
gation principle may be a "more promising theme" in equal protection doctrine);
Fiss, supra note 169, at 177 ("We should become aware of the fact that the
antidiscrimmation principle is not inevitable and, indeed, that its predominance
may be traceable to institutional values that have little relevance for individual
morality.").
212 See, e.g., MACINTYRE, supra note 8; ROSENFELD, supra note 211,
Michelman, supra note 151, at 345-54 (rejecting formalistic arguments against
regulation of racist speech).
213 See the discussion around affirmative action. Those who support
affirmative action do not deny that it may produce a harm, but that the harm it
might produce does not merit strict scrutiny. See, e.g., ROSENFELD, supra note
211, at 163-215; see also Regents of Umv of Cal. v Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) (plurality held that consideration of race as a factor in admission to




Doing so will enable us to understand fully why racist speech is a social
liberty that must be properly weighed.
Freedom of speech is part of the larger, more general narrative of
liberty Within tius liberty narrative, there is a fairly rich, but also
mcoherent and contradictory approach to harm. Many of these flaws have
substantially contributed to the confusion within the free speech narrative
of harm. In looking at how harm has been addressed within the liberty
theory m general and how these problems and assumptions affect the way
harm is accounted for m the free speech theory, an alternative approach
is warranted.
D. Mill's Theory of Liberty
The modem development of the theory of liberty in general and free
speech in particular can be traced back to John Stuart Mill.2 14 Mill
argued that m order for the government to show respect for the mdividu-
al, it must respect her autonomy and liberty Mill both defined and
limited liberty as one's freedom from restraint - having the right to do
as one pleases as long as such action does not injure another. These lines
of demarcation provided freedom for oneself and security for others. To
maintain these conditions was seen as the primary function of the
state.21 5 Thus, harm plays an important role in the definition and
limitation of liberty These requirements for freedom and security are
critical to the ideas of Mill and other liberal theorists on how society
should be ordered to promote individual liberty 216 Acts that do not
interfere with or injure another are what Mill thought of as self-regarding
acts. Mill believed that this was the natural boundary for liberty and
autonomy 217
The second part of Mill's theory of freedom relates to what could be
called social or utilitarian liberties. These liberties are other-regarding
214 MILL, supra note 21.
215 Id. at 13-16.
216 See, e.g., Allen C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, The "Rights" Stuff.
Roberto Unger and Beyond, 62 TEx. L. REv 1477, 1483 (1984) ('Individuals want
maximum freedom to pursue their own self-interest At the same time, they require
security from subjective interference of others.'); THOMAS HOBBES, LEvIATHAN
86, 139-48 (J.C.A. Gaskm ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1651) ("By LIBERTY, is
understood the absence of external impediments: which impediments, may oft
take away part of a man's power to do what he would "Id. at 86.).
21 MILL, supra note 21, at 13-17
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acts. 218 In contrast to self-regarding acts, they are not natural liberties
because they injure or interfere with others. Since these second liberties
threaten the security and liberties of others, they require social allocation.
The force of this position is rooted in the notion that people are equal. If
A is equal to B, A's liberty does not give her the right to injure B with
impunity Such an arrangement would deny B her liberty and equality
Nor is it adequate in society, in contrast to the hypothetical state of
nature, to suggest the response to A's injuring B is to allow B the
freedom to injure A in return.219 Such an arrangement would create a
state in which no one, except possibly the strongest, was secure.22
Mill understood that there may be a need to allow one person to
interfere with or harm another, but that this is a social issue that cannot
be justified as a natural liberty Society has no claim on allocating natural
liberties. Tins claim belongs to the individual. The individual, however,
does not have a personal claim to social liberties. This claim belongs to
society It is society, therefore, that must allocate social liberties based on
the question of social utility While Mill believed that there would be
some dispute about the distinction between self-regarding and other-
regarding acts, he believed that the vast majority of acts were clearly one
or the other.22' He also believed, albeit wrongly, that most liberties are
clearly self-regarding. This error has been reproduced in the approach to
speech. Within the context of speech, Mill recognized, much like most
traditional free speech proponents, that some speech can harm, and that
some of these harms should not be allowed.222 Because he and other
liberal theorists have considered this class and sub-class of harms to be
very small, however, the harm from speech has seldom received serious
attention.
Because Mill defines individual liberty, as opposed to social liberty,
as actions that do not interfere with or injure others, 223 the question of
which individual liberties should be allowed to harm others does not
218 For a discussion of other-regardingproperty rights, see powell, supra note
191, at 372-73 ("Property is never self-regarding m the strong sense. It
potentially always affects others and gives the nght holder power over others
"1).
219 This is the problem with claims that the cure for bad speech is more
speech. While this might be useful for bad speech, the cure for injurious speech
is not more speech.
220 See HOBBES, supra note 216, at 86-87
'2' MILL, supra note 21, at 13-17
222 Id. at 54-55.
22 Id. at 13-17
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make sense within his framework. By definition, individual liberties do
not harm others. When one's action affects others, society has jurisdiction
over it. Joseph Singer summarizes Mill's position as follows:
Mill asserted that the self-regarding theory would generally consti-
tute a sufficient legitimating theory for a liberal legal system. However,
he recognized that there might be exceptional cases in which one per-
son's conduct harmed the interest of others; and yet we might still want
to allow such conduct despite the injurious consequences. The liberty to
inflict such damage without legal redress might be justified by its
overall societal utility 224
As will be discussed below, however, one can credibly assert that much
of racist speech does not fall into the category of natural individual
liberty
E. Free Speech
.Free speech is a special liberty within Mill's framework and within
the classical liberty theory It derives its special attributes from three
assumptions: (1) it is necessary in the pursuit of truth, (2) it is necessary
for self-development, and (3) it does not cause "real or substantial" harm.
Although the strength of all of these assumptions has been challenged to
some degree,225 it is this last assumption that concerns us here.
The assumption that speech can cause offensiveness or be an
annoyance but not produce substantial harm is a critical position for the
special protection of free speech. This assumption makes more plausible
the claim that, given speech's significant value, we should be willing to
tolerate some mconvemence and discomfort. Even within traditional free
speech circles, however, there is usually some recognition that speech can
and does cause substantial harm. Consider, for example, the law of libel
224 Joseph N. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence
from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV 975, 998.
225 See ISAIAH BERLIN, FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 185 (1969). There is an
assumption that, because free speech is a specific liberty explicitly named m the
Constitution, it is afforded more weight than general, unnamed liberty. Therefore,
some harm should be allowed for free speech that is not allowed for general
liberty. The limits of these harms have not been adequately developed, but it is
assumed that they are not substantial. See BOLLINGER, supra note 40, at 35-39;
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, supra note 164, at 14.
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or conspiracy These speech acts are regulated in large part because the
substantial harth they cause is recognized. Notwithstanding these and
other exceptions to the claim that speech does not substantially injure,
there is still often the insistence that speech acts do not actually
harm.
226
Professor Bollinger addresses tis last assumption. "Whether explicit-
ly or implicitly, the classical defense of free speech views actions, but not
words, as capable of inflicting cognizable injury "227 Although Professor
Bollinger is a strong free speech advocate, he is clear that free speech
theory cannot continue to rest on this false assumption.
The entire subject of interaction between speakers and listeners is
therefore, a matter of considerable complexity. We trvialize the
problems speech behavior can pose for any individual or community.
[S]peech can produce important harms. This, of course, is
clearly revealed when speech is explicitly insulting or threatening to
particular individuals. [Nor is the harm necessarily immediate or short
term.]
2 8
Many modem free speech commentators are acutely aware of the fact that
Mill inadequately addresses harm. Once harm is seriously considered,
there is no logically consistent or natural boundary for self-regarding acts
within Ins framework. If other-regarding acts are broadly defined, free
speech advocates fear, much of what we value as individual liberties will
be destroyed. Put another way, almost all of our acts, even the most
private, can be conceived of, and in fact can be, seriously injurious to
someone else. This leaves Mill's theoretical foundation, as noted by
Professor Baker, in a shambles:
Despite the widespread appeal of Mill's argument, it lacks criteria
for determining when a person's behavior "harms" others or when a
person's manner of acting "concerns others." If "feeling harmed" or
having one's interactions with others unfavorably "affected" count as
criteria for "harm" or for being properly "concerned," then any action,
226 For a list of speech exceptions and harms, see GREENAWALT, SPEECH,
supra note 164, at 143-48; Delgado, Campus Anti-Racism Rules, supra note 20,
at 375-80; Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets, supra note 159, at 294-307
227 BOLLINGER, supra note 40, at 61.
228 Id. at 64-65.
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no matter how privately undertaken, can be of concern to others, can
harm others.
229
The response that many traditional free speech advocates make to this
insight is to try, understandably, to deny most speech harms. Their two
main strategies for achieving this are either to trivialize the harm caused
by speech230 or to try to distinguish the harm that speech can cause
from other types of harm.231 Each of these efforts falls. Those who
trivialize the harm that can be caused by speech often do so by insisting
that speech can be "offensive," which carries a very different connotation
from "harmful" or "injurious." The claim that speech injuries are trivial
has so little currency that I will not address it here.232
The second position, which appears to be stronger, is that speech
harms are substantially different from non-speech harms. While at first
glance this position seems plausible, it is not. Consider just two of the
ways that speech injuries are often claimed to be different. First,
traditional free speech advocates allege, speech does not usually injure
directly; rather only the reaction to the speech by the listener, if he or she
is persuaded by the speech, causes harm. This claim is clearly wrong.
Many of the injuries that Professors Lawrence and Matsuda chronicle are
direct.233 Indeed the "fighting words" doctrine recognizes that the injury
229 BAKER, supra note 21, at 73.
230 Professor Bollinger makes a similar claim. BOLLINGER, supra note 40, at
64. Professor Delgado is largely responsible for moving the current debate on the
issue of harm beyond the notion that speech Injuries are trivial. See Delgado,
Campus Anti-Racism Rules, supra note 20, at 375-80.
231 A number of commentators take this approach, including BAKER, supra
note 21, at 55-65 and TRIBE, supra note 65, at 1134.
232 For a discussion of the seriousness of harms caused by speech, see
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, supra note 164, at 143-48, 298 (stating four concerns
about group epithets and slurs: provocation of violence, wounding of person to
whom they are directed, offending hearers of the slurs, and reinforcement of
prejudice); Delgado, Campus Anti-Racism Rules, supra note 20, at 375-80
(stating that speech can violate "equal dignity"); Lawrence, supra note 33, at
458-66 ("To engage in a debate about the first amendment without a full
understanding of the nature and extent of the harm of racist speech risks making
the first amendment an instrument of domination rather than a vehicle of
liberation." Id. at 459.); Matsuda, supra note 45, at 2335-41 ("As much as one
may try to resist a piece of hate propaganda, the effect on one's self-esteem and
sense of personal security is devastating." Id. at 2337.).
233 See Lawrence, supra note 33, at 452-56, 460-62; Matsuda, supra note 45,
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may be direct. When the speech is addressed to the victim, the mjury is
immediate and does not depend on the persuasion of the audience or
listener by the idea or truth of the speech." 4
Second, free speech proponents claim speech injuries differ from non-
speech injuries because they result only in non-physical injury Professor
Matsuda has challenged this position directly She has shown that racist
speech not only can injure but that the injury is both psychological and
physical. 5 Although the line between physical and non-physical mjury
is no more secure than the line between speech and conduct, traditional
free speech advocates continue to rely on this distinction. Professor Baker
adopts this distinction between physical and non-physical mjunes caused
by speech acts and non-speech acts. "The key quality distinguishing most
harms caused by protected speech acts from most harms caused by
unprotected activities is that speech-caused harms typically occur only to
the extent that people 'mentally' adopt perceptions or attitudes."236
Even if one could sustain the claim that speech injuries are psychic,
it would not justify the distinction between speech and non-speech harms.
What is at issue is not whether the injury is psychological or not, but how
serious the harm is and how it has an impact on important individual and
social values. While the desire to distinguish speech harm from non-
speech harm is understandable," it is not useful. Ultimately, it is a
at 2336-38. Cf Greenawalt, Free Speech, supra note 149, at 145-48 (discussing
relevant justifications useful in determining whether communication should be
protected as free speech). Consider some of the speech that is now regulated and
that injures, such as blackmail. See Delgado, Campus Anti-Racism Rules, supra
note 20, at 377-78 (discussing the exceptions to free speech createdby the courts
in the past century).
" For further discussion of the possible immediacy of speech injuries, see
BOLLINGER, supra note 40, at 61-73 ("[S]peech can produce important harms.
This, of course, is closely revealed when speech is explicitly insulting or
threatening to particular individuals."); GREENAWALT, SPEECH, supra note 164,
at 292-301 ("When directed at its object, such language can wound and humiliate
and may be designed to provoke retaliation, but, abusive words often
make some vague assertion about facts and values.").
In many ways, tlus is similar to the reluctance to recognize obscenity as
speech. It, like racist speech, does not usually allow for deliberation by the
listener. I would still argue that a better way of addressing this speech is not by
refusing to recognize it as First Amendment speech, but by examining the harm
caused by the speech.
" See Matsuda, supra note 45, at 2335-41.
26 BAKER, supra note 21, at 55-56.
" Free speech proponents want any harm allowed to restrict speech to be a
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weak effort to avoid a difficult dilemma and privileges free speech.
Professor Baker, for example, realizes that when one uses Ins or her
liberty, including speech, to harm or coerce another or to undermine their
autonomy, it calls into question the legitimacy of the speech acts. 8 A
number of commentators who call for regulation of racist speech argue
this specific point. One of the values of free speech is the advancement
of autonomy Yet speech and specifically racist speech can injure
autonomy In recognizing this paradox, Professor Frank Michelman notes
that there has yet to be an adequate response:
If the experiential claim is true, it means that racist speech contri-
butes no less to systemic, race-based impairments of communicative
autonomy than it does to impairments of participation in democracy;
parallel to the paradoxes of public discourse and democracy is the
paradox of autonomy Neither sort of formalist, anti-censorability
argument has yet - to my knowledge - fully and successfully faced
down either the realist insight or the experiential claim.239
The physical/not-physical harm distinction does not address tIns paradox.
Professor Baker appears to recognize this paradox, but in order to
protect a formalist position of speech and autonomy, he understandably
fails to face it. "Nevertheless, the respect-for-autonomy rationale for
protecting speech does not apply if the speaker coerces the other or if the
speaker physically or otherwise improperly interferes with the other's
rights.""24 After arguing that protected speech should be limited by
very narrow, well-defined class of harm. Tius concern is appropriate because the
failure to limit such a class of harm could destroy virtually all free speech. If this
harm is defined broadly, it is possible to think of some harm produced by almost
any utterance. The response, however, cannot simply be to build a fortress
around free speech or simply to assert that it is the Archimedean point for our
society. Instead, we must identify the values that we are trying to promote with
free speech, and examine how limitations on speech would negatively impact on
those values. It is not enough, however, to understand how speech values can be
harmed by limitations on speech; we must also begin to understand how speech
can harm values, including some of the values the free speech tries to promote.
238 See BAKER, supra note 21, at 56-66.
239 Michelman, supra note 151, at 353.
240 BAKER, supra note 21, at 56 (emphasis added). Professor Baker's First
Amendment theory is one of the most powerful and coherent of those which try
to formulate a justification for the current thinking on free speech. Professor
Baker also is aware of the problem of privileging speech and takes seriously the
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"coercion" and interference with other's rights, Professor Baker later
argues that those rights and the definition of coercion must be limited by
concern for speech.
But identification of coercive categories of speech requires great care.
People constantly invoke loosely formulated or inappropriately broad
notions of coercion to justify regulation of various behavior, including
speech of winch they disapprove. The inevitable misapplication of tis
liberty approach to freedom of speech will most likely involve
expansive, imprecise notions of coercion- while meaningful limits on
government's authority to restrict speech will require a narrow, precise
and defensible concept of coercion that is clearly distinguished from the
broader notion of harm.24'
To his credit, Professor Baker does not adopt a positivist notion of
coercion, nor does he insist that the coercion must be physical, but
instead suggests a normative notion that continues to change as we
change. Despite this, Ins notion of coercion does appear to be illegiti-
mately limited by his notion of free speech. Unless one is ready to
believe, which I am not, that speech can never be coercive, Professor
Baker's position is not helpful.
There are a number of other serious problems with the position that
non-physical injuries do not count. First, this position essentially adopts
the flawed reasoning of the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson.242 In defining
its holding that separate but equal resulted in no injury to blacks, the
Court noted that blacks were in the same position as whites in their
physical ability to ride in rail coaches.243 Whites were restricted from
riding in cars with blacks, and blacks were restricted from riding in cars
with wIntes.2" When pressed about the psychic stigma and the emotion-
al mjury, the Court reasoned that there was no such injury, and if there
was, it was all in the minds of blacks.24 One may wonder where else
psychic injury would be if not in the mind.
claim for a substantive notion of equality. I have learned a great deal from
examining his material.
241 Id. at 56.
242 Plessy v Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
243 Id. at 548-49.
244 Id.
24s Id. at 551.
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Second, the nineteenth century idea that the body and mind can be
easily split off from each other has been called into question by a number
of modem theorists.246 There may be reasons to try to distinguish
between different types of harm, but first there must be a recognition that
serious injuries, psycic or otherwise, are serious injuries. As Professor
Lawrence noted in his discussion of Brown, the Court rejected the
materialistic view of injury suggested by the Court in Plessy 247 It is
clear that the Court in Brown was very concerned with the psychic harm
that the stigma of segregation inflicted on black children.24 Even
though white children were also segregated, they did not receive the same
psychic harm.249 As in Brown, psychic harm was the central concern for
the Court m Loving v. Virginia.250 In yet another case, Palmer v.
Thompson,25" ' Justice White's dissent pointed out that racial discrimina-
tion causes an injury in the form of psycic harm.252 In essence, the
Court has recogmzed in a number of cases that, contrary to the mneteenth
century notion, one cannot neatly separate psychic injury from physical
injury
Even if the two arguments against the distinction between physical
and mental/emotional injury were not persuasive, the proponents of free
speech could not comfortably rest on such a distinction. One of the main
justifications given for not limiting speech is that it would interfere with
the self-development of the individual.253 The Court has acknowledged
246 See, e.g., UNGER, supra note 17, at 36-41 (supporting the premise that
will and desire are not totally independent and together constitute "self").
247 Lawrence, supra note 33, at 441. There are a number of areas in the law
that have refused to adopt either the materialism of Plessy or the position that
physical and non-physical harms can be separate. For instance, legal doctrine
recognizes that mental abuse has physical consequences and a hostile workplace
can cause psychological injury, which can result in the loss of a job. Likewise,
tort law recognizes mental anguish. To claim that racist speech injury is
psychological, then, is irrelevant.
24' Brown v Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
249 Id.
250 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
25 Palmer v Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
252 Id. at 266-69 (White, J., dissenting).
253 See BAKER, supra note 21, at 50-51 ("[ljndividual self-fulfillment and
participation in change are fundamental purposes of the First Amendment.");
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 564-66 (1948)
(arguing that limiting free speech would create a "national unanimity" where
individuals are not free to go about their own tasks).
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tlus value as a justification for not limiting speech. The "basic human
desire for recognition" is satisfied through speech as a medium for self-
expression and self-realization.254 This is, however, essentially a non-
physical argument. No one suggests that the physical injury to the person
whose speech is limited will be any greater than that of the person who
is exposed to an emotional or psychic injury caused by speech.255 If we
are concerned, however, with the internal development of our minds and
souls, which I believe is appropriate, then distinguishing between a
physical and non-physical injury is of little value. The free speech theorist
using tlus argument would have to argue that non-physical injuries to
speakers are somehow different from non-physical injuries to non-
speakers.
There may be strong arguments for assigning liberty rights to the
individual, even to the point of allowing some injuries, but tius is a social
question that must be resolved through social balancing. There has been
no such balancing about speech harm because of the failure to understand
adequately these harms. The result of such an enterprise undoubtedly
would be to allow certain harms and not others, depending in part on
how serious we consider the harm caused by limiting speech, as
compared to that caused by allowing it. It is understandable that free
speech advocates will want to avoid such a calculus. Indeed, part of the
function of calling something a liberty is to avoid this calculus. However,
efforts to ground speech as an individual liberty - as opposed to a social
liberty, or to make claim that speech is psychic and not physical - does
not address this issue of harm or the paradox discussed above.
Consider again, for example, Professor Baker's liberty arguments for
free speech. He argues that free speech is necessary for self-expression
and actualization, as well as for participation. Professor Baker calls for
grounding free speech in the liberty principle as opposed to what he
considers the societal or utilitarian focus of the use of speech to find the
truth in the marketplace.
[W]e have an account of the legal order or of the collective whole that
commits it to respect individual autonomy or a realm of individual
liberty that serves the values of self-fulfillment and participation m
change. Moreover, this account of the foundational status of this realm
254 Procumer v Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring).
255 Obviously, limited speech can mjure more than just the speaker, but the
claim is still valid.
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of liberty would help explain why utilitarian balancing does not justify
limiting First Amendment rights.5 6
By focusing on the value of speech to the individual in her development
and autonomy, Professor Baker hopes to avoid this inevitable social
calculus. If one uses speech to deny someone self-expression and
autonomy to participate, then we again have the paradox. The value we
wish to promote by speech is the value that the speech undermines.
Moreover, the non-physical, psychic injury that this speech causes is of
the same order as the injury that limiting this speech would also cause.
Neither Professor Baker's liberty theory nor his harm theory can tell us
why we should allow speech under such circumstances.257
This discussion of speech and harm has been well within the narrative
of free speech. This suggests that even within this narrative, there are
strong reasons to reformulate our thinking about free speech and harm.
The discussion also reveals that many of the underlying assumptions
concerning the relationship of harm and free speech are undeveloped and
seriously incoherent. Indeed, one cannot ignore the harms that can be
caused by speech without undermining the core values of free speech
itself.
III. PARTICIPATION:
THE VALUE MEDIATING BETWEEN Two WORLDS
Harm is a limitation for both free speech and equality, but by itself
is too broad a concept to address the tension between the two narratives.
One way to consider which harms should be recognized and possibly
prohibited, or at least considered in the balancing process, is to focus on
speech acts (or equality) that harm other constitutional norms and values.
This approach alone, however, turns out not to be helpful. It merely
restates the difficulty now being faced in the debate about racist speech
within the context of free speech and equality There must be some
process, norm, or value that helps us to identify which harms we want to
limit without sacrificing either sets of constitutional values when they
256 BAKER, supra note 21, at 50. I would agree with Professor Baker to the
extent that he only addresses the classical utilitarian model of producing the
greatest pleasure. However, to the extent that he suggests balancing i inappropri-
ate because the First Amendment is a liberty interest, I believe he is wrong.
257 1 am not using utility in the classical sense. Instead, I am suggesting that




conflict. This limiting norm or value must be common to free speech and
equality, if we are to address the difficulties posed by incommensurabi-
lity Participation is such a value and is appropriate to mediate between
free speech and equality Before discussing participation, I would like to
state what this mediation does not involve.
It is important to note that the process of mediation between
incommensurable paradigms is not simply the application of a set of rules
or methodology that can be mechamcally applied to resolve the conflict
between competing narratives. In fact, one cannot know beforehand if the
tension can be mediated. In discussing the tension between negative
liberty and equality, Isaiah Berlin warns us against adopting the belief
that we can know beforehand that the tension can be resolved.
The sinple point which I am concerned to make is that where ultimate
values are irreconcilable, clear-cut solutions cannot, in principle, be
found. To decide rationally in such situations is to decide in the light of
general ideals, the over-all pattern of life pursued by a man or a group
or a society. If the claims of two (or more than two) types of liberty
prove incompatible in a particular case, and ifthis is an instance of the
clash of values at once absolute and incommensurable, it is better to
face this intellectually uncomfortablefact than to ignore it, or automati-
cally attribute it to some deficiency on our part which could be
eliminated by an increase in skill or knowledge; or, what is worse still,
suppress one of the competing values altogether by pretending that it is
identical with its rival - and so end by distorting both. Yet, it appears
to me, it is exactly this that philosophical momsts who demand final
solutions - tidiness and harmony at any price - have done and are
doing still When such dilemmas arise it is one thing to say that
every effort must be made to resolve them, and another that it is certain
a prori that a correct, conclusive solution must always in principle be
discoverable 258
Berlin further warns of exaggerating the distance by adopting what
Professor Drucilla Cornell terms the myth of the fiameworks.2 59 Berlin
258 BERLIN, supra note 225, at 1 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Berlin
suggests throughout tis book that liberty and equality are two such mcommensu-
rable sets of values.
25 See Cornell, supra note 10, at 141 (citing KARL POPPER, NORMAL




notes that, in practice, we have been able to communicate with each other
without these universal foundations.26 °
Participation plays a central role in justifying the value of both free
speech and equality Because this value is used in two different contexts,
it is possible that it may mean something quite different. I am concerned
both with how participation has been used and how we might use it in
relationship to free speech and equality to face the paradox while
mediating the tension. This process ultimately will not be monological,
but communicative and dialogical. It may suggest how we could
collectively approach these issues.
A. Participation and Harm
I will now examine why participation is the appropriate value to
mediate between free speech and equality My claim is that participation
must be the primary value which, within a particular context, will give
shape to free speech and equality The context with which I will be
specifically concerned is critical institutions or locations, as exemplified
by the workplace and college campus. Harm to participation in this
context is of a special order and provides a basis for balancing or limiting
liberties that might be allowed in other contexts.
Participation and membership in critical institutions are essential to
the development of both social values and the autonomous self.261 It is
necessary for people to participate in a particular institution in order to
maintain or constitute their autonomy In other words, to protect
individual autonomy, participation injuries must be limited. Further, for
participation in these institutions to be meaningful, it must be more than
a mere possibility One must look to see what is happening, in fact as
well as in law, to see if participation has been limited. The formal notion
of participation of traditional free speech advocates is inadequate.262
Participation must be sufficiently free of domination and subjugation so
that the law's norms and values, produced by autonomous and equal
beings, have intersubjective legitimacy 263 These norms are necessary
260 See BERLIN, supra note 225, at lii.
261 See supra notes 21 and 215-25 and accompanying text. Although many
view participation as only instrumental - furthering general rules, structures, and
norms - it is also properly seen as constitutive. If the self cannot participate, it
ceases to exist.
262 See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of formal
participation.
263 Professor Baker notes that when one is coerced, one's expressions are not
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to support and define the contextual grounds for individual self-develop-
ment. The slave and master can apparently participate, but they cannot
generate collective valid norms. The concept of harm necessary to
preserve this participation must be broader than the material formal-
ism of Plessy, where the lack of substantive equality undermined both
the autonomous and social value of equality; the concept, however,
should not be so broad as to consume free speech, which would also
undermine autonomy and the production of intersubjective norms and
values 264
I am aware that I am moving toward a concept of free speech and
equality that may be contested. Indeed, any concept of free speech and
equality can be questioned, m part, because of the nature of language
and, in part, because these are living, constitutional norms that are not
given specific meaning. For the purpose of this Article, I do not intend
to try to resolve the debate over the precise meanings of these two sets
of constitutional values.265 My position on these points is much more
modest and not so "tidy" I am asserting that participation must be central
to any adequate meaning of free speech and equality, not as a matter of
philosophical entailment m the abstract, but within the context of our
histoncal, constitutional democracy
autonomous. BAKER, supra note 21, at 56-60 (discussing that respect for
individual autonomy requires a "recognition that a person has the right to use
speech to develop herself"). A master and slave can participate m a conversation,
but it is not the type that values free speech and equality. See ROBERTO M.
UNGER, PASSION, AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 14 (1984) ("of all the circum-
stances that aggravate tis clash between the requirement of self-assertion, the
most influential m society is mechanisms of dependence and dominion that
turn all social involvements into threats of subjugation").
264 For a discussion of how a substantive notion of equality, which embodies
the concept of anti-subordination, could undermine free speech, see Michelman,
supra note 151, at 347-52.
265 For a good discussion about the meaning of free speech, see BAKER,
supra note 21, at 47-69 (discussing the values of the First Amendment in the
context of the liberty theory); Emerson, supra note 21, at 878-86 (discussing the
functions of free speech in a democratic society). For a good discussion of the
constitutional meaning of equality, see KARST, supra note 22, at 1-2 (discussing
the different aspects of equality as developed in American law and society); Fiss,
supra note 169, at 108 ("The [Equal Protection] Clause contains the word 'equal'
and thereby gives constitutional status to the ideal of equality, but that ideal is
capable of a wide range of meanings."); Lawrence, supra note 33, at 457-76




B. Participation and Free Speech
Although traditional proponents of free speech often disagree on
which values underlie the First Amendment, there is virtual consensus on
two central principles: participation in the democratic process and self-
actualization through self-expresson.2 6 Much of the debate among free
speech proponents focuses on whether speech is primarily a social value,
enabling participation in the cultural and political structures, or if speech
is primarily a liberty value, promoting self-actualization and self-
expression to achieve and maintain autonomy 267 As I suggested above
and will develop more fully below, however, participation is central both
as a social (consequential) value and an individual or liberty (non-conse-
quential) value.
The debate about the underlying values of free speech has been
informed recently by the work of Professor Habermas and the increasing
acceptance of an anti-objectivist stance and an anti-foundationalist stance
toward truth and value.26 Professor Habermas also sees the individual
as always situated in culture.269 According to Professor Habermas, the
individual's needs, wants, and identity have meaning only because of the
social/cultural context.27 Indeed autonomy itself is seen in mtersubjec-
tive, communicative terms.271 Early proponents of free speech often
viewed truth-finding and law-making as essential parts of the social
value of free speech.272 Nonetheless, tlus notion that truth already exists
and is waiting to be discovered has come under increasing attack. Truth
is increasingly seen as created instead of discovered.273 Professor
Habermas has used this evolving view of truth to assert that validity of
truth or norms is legitimized not simply by its accuracy, but primarily by
266 See BAKER, supra note 21, at 47; MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 158, at 54-60;
Emerson, supra note 21, at 878.
267 BAKER, supra note 21, at 47-60.
268 THoMAS MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JORGEN HABERMAS 59
(1978).
269 Id. at 334.
270 Id.
271 See SEYLA BENHABiB, CRITIQUE, NORM, AND UTOPIA 282 (1986). Com-
mumcation is not limited to language; it also includes acts. Our norms and
values, and indeed our language, are produced through our intersubjective
engagement with each other. See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 10, at 169-74.
272 See MEIKLFJOHN, supra note 158, at 56-60; MILL, supra note 21,
Emerson, supra note 21, at 881.




its communicative production. Tins m turn has placed greater emphasis
on the value of participation. It is through the mtersubjective communica-
tive process, when properly structured, that truth claims are made and
validated. Professor Habermas indicates under what conditions such
claims should have force. As one commentator explains:
The four conditions of the ideal speech situation are: first, each
participant must have an equal chance to initiate and to continue
communication; second, each must have an equal chance to make
assertions, recommendations, and explanations, and to challenge
justifications. Together we can [c]all these the "symmetry condition."
Third, all must have equal chances as actors to express their wishes,
feelings, and intentions; and fourth, the speakers must act as if m
contexts of action there is an equal distribution of chances "to order and
resist orders, to pormise [sic] and to refuse, to be accountable for one's
conduct and to demand accountability from others." Let me call the
latter two the "reciprocity condition." While the symmetry stipulation
of the ideal speech situation refers to speech acts alone and to condi-
tions governing their employment, the reciprocity condition refers to
existing action contexts, and requires a suspension of situations of
untruthfulness and duplicity on the one hand, and of inequality and
subordination on the other.274
Free speech proponents have used these insights to support the value of
free speech that is open to all.275
The value of Professor Habermas's approach is often muted by a
failure to consider seriously what distorts and invalidates the commumca-
tive process in generating truth claims.276 Professor Habermas asserts
that domination and unequal power undermine the validity of truth claims
that are produced through this process. He calls for a move toward an
274 BENHABIB, supra note 271, at 285 (quoting and translating Jiirgen Habermas,
Wahrheitstheonen, in WmKLICHKEIT uND REFLEXION (H. Fahrenbach ed. 1973))
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis m original) (editonal comment added).
275 See BAKER, supra note 21, at 121 (supporting "protection for individually
valued practices even when these practices outstrip existing collective pref-
erences"); Paul G. Chevigny, Philosophy of Language and Free Expression, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV 157 (1980) (noting that the two main bistoncaljustifications for
free speech are the promotion of individualism and free exchange of ideas); Post,
Racist Speech, supra note 33, at 279-85 (arguing that freedom of expression is
necessary for the knd of public discourse required by democracy).




ideal speech situation where participation is not distorted by power or
domination. It should be emphasized that this is not a call for a new
language theory, rather it points to the need to identify the condition in
which intersubjective language claims have validity The focus of this
ideal is the condition for meaningful participation. This ideal requires
meaningful equality and mutuality among the participants. Professor
Habermas's requirements for ideal speech are closely tied to what is
necessary for full participation and membership.277 His concept of the
conditions for participation is very similar to what one commentator calls
the postulate of equality
[A]Ithough different values, such as liberty and state neutrality, have
assumed a paramount role in certain versions of liberal theory, at the
highest levels of abstraction, equality can be viewed as the principal
operating norm of liberal theory. At the lower level of abstraction,
where such version of liberal theory as the libertarian, contractanan,
utilitarian, and egalitarian conceptions operate, there may be disagree-
ments as to whether liberty or equality should be ranked higher than the
other. At the highest levels of abstraction, however, all versions of
liberal theory are united m rejecting claims of natural hierarchy in favor
of assertion that all human beings are in some fundamental sense equal
to one another.
I shall [to this proposition] refer as the "postulate of equali-
ty,, 278
In our liberal society, we recognize the normative foundation of the equal
right to participate. If value and truth claims are to have any legitimacy,
participation must be open to all as equals and uncoerced. "[There is] no
universalizability without participation." '279 The only universal that is
recognized, then, is the right to universal participation. Those who wish
to limit participation, therefore, have a tremendous burden to overcome.
The traditional notion of participation, simply as a way to find the
truth and for autonomous beings to make laws, suffers from another
limitation imposed by the underlying assumption that participation is only
instrumental. This traditional view holds that participation is used by
already autonomous beings to assert their autonomy and to find truth.
277 See BENHABIB, supra note 271, at 282-83; BERNSTEIN, supra note 3;
ROSENFELD, supra note 211.
278 ROSENFELD, supra note 211, at 20.
279 BENHABIB, supra note 271, at 315.
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This position is based on the assumption that if one is required to obey
laws in which one does not have the opportunity to participate, then one
is heteronomous, not autonomous. While this is a useful proposition, it
is inadequate because it does not address the role of participation in
constituting and maintaining our autonomy If one is demed participation
and membership, it is doubtful that one can even develop an autonomous
self. This instrumentalist notion of participation as only serving the
purpose of self-government has been directly challenged.
[D]emocracy understood as self-government in a social setting is not a
terminus for individually held rights and values; it is their starting place.
Autonomy is not the condition of democracy, democracy is the
condition of autonomy. Without participating in the common life that
defines them and in the decision-making that shapes their social habitat,
women and men cannot become individuals.280
Indeed, this last statement makes clear that participation is a better
mediating value than autonomy because autonomy is itself communicative
and requires participation.2"' If one is denied membership and participa-
tion, it is doubtful that one can ever develop an autonomous self.
Although we begin the construction of our identities in our
primordial communities of family and tribe individuality itself- as
reflected in self-knowledge, self-respect, or self-expression - is
attainable only within a community.
Self-expression is possible in solitude but unlikely outside of a
cultural matrix.
2 2
Participation is not something we simply use; it is through participation
that we obtain and maintain our autonomy 283 As Professor Habermas
makes clear, our autonomy is communicative. Participation, therefore, has
both a social and liberty role.
280 BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY xv (1984).
28 Theorists, such as Professor Baker, who draw a sharp distinction between
the liberty and social values of speech and associate the liberty value with
autonomy fail to consider the social aspect of speech and thus autonomy.
282 KARST, supra note 22, at 191.
283 See generally KARST, supra note 22. Professor Karst and a growing
number of commentators argue that participation produces and precedes any
concept of liberty or equality.
1996-97]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
C. Participation and Equality
Equality proponents are also increasingly noting the central role of
participation. Although some commentators have argued that equality is
formal and requires no particular normative content,1 4 they confuse
equality as a philosophical concept with equality as an historical,
constitutional value. Not only does the constitutional value of equality
have substantive content, it must.285 Commentators have argued that
there is no way of interpreting or applying the Fourteenth Amendment
without some substantive, normative notion of equality 286 The question
that commentators and the Court must address is not whether equality has
substantive content, but what that content is.
Participation must play a central value m any substantive concept of
equality Professor Kenneth L. Karst argues that the historical andjudicial
conception of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is grounded in
the right to belong, participate, and be a full member of society He
asserts that this right prompted not only the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but also a number of the great decisions by the Court,
including Brown.2" One of the evils of segregation, then, was that it
denied blacks the right to participate as equal citizens. Slavery is an even
more graphic example of being excluded from participation. The refusal
to recognize the people held as slaves as full members of society was
closely tied to the legal status of slaves as non-persons devoid of
autonomy 288 The dubious non-person status of the slave was reaffirmed
by the Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford.28 9 This harm was not only to
the social participation of blacks, but also to their development of
self.
290
The philosopher Michael Walzer makes a similar point about the
primacy of the value of participation. He states that the primary good that
284 See Westen, supra note 39, at 537-77
285 See BAKER, supra note 21, at 40, 89-91, KARST, supra note 22, at 23-42,
151-72; TRIBE, supra note 65, at 1436-1687; Fiss, supra note 169, at 107
286 ROSENFELD, supra note 211, at 136-62; Fiss, supra note 169
287 See KARST, supra note 22, at 56.
288 Id. at 43-49
289 Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that a "free negro
of the African race" is not a citizen within the meaning of the Constitution).
290 Such an injury not only distorts the identity and autonomy of blacks who
are excluded, but also that of whites who are included. This could be called a
liberty harm. In addition, the social norms and values that are produced from
such inequality lack legitimacy. See BELL, supra note 171, at 26-50.
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a society distributes is not liberty or equality, but membership. It is from
membership and the right to participate that all other goods are produced
and take on meamng.2 91 The basic premise of our constitutional democ-
racy is that all citizens should have an equal right to participate in both
political and cultural life. 2
While the exact, and even the functional, meaning of free speech and
equality may remain seriously contested, the centrality of participation to
both sets of values is not controversial. Although the importance of
participation has been foreshadowed m earlier cases and legal doc-
tnne,29 its use as a mediating value for free speech and equality may
be limited without greater efforts to concretize the use of participation.
What participation means in a given society will be determined by the
conditions and values within that society Walzer is instructive in
addressing this issue. He acknowledges that what is necessary for full
membership will depend on the society and the time in history He
further states that this fact suggests that one must look at the particular
society in concretizing membership and participation.294
What is needed in order to be a full member in our society is, at a
nmmum, a set of real participation rights in critical institutions where
autonomy, societal values, and norms are constituted. Participation so
conceived is not only instrumental, to find the truth or make laws, it is
also intrinsic to the individual's autonomy Participation must, therefore,
be open and yet allow the individual to withdraw The cost of member-
ship cannot include subordination and domination. One's participation can
be undermined in law and in fact. While voluntary withdrawal from parti-
cipation is consistent with this value, exclusion is not.
There is an apparent tension in this universal concept of participation
that appears to restate the paradox: What .if one's participation is based
on one's ability to prevent others from participating? As an abstract
matter, this is a difficult problem. In the context of our constitutional
democracy, it is not. Our constitutional and normative structure is not
neutral.29 The claim that one's participation needs require another not
291 Id.
292 See WALZER, supra note 22, at 31.
293 See Reynolds v Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that a claim of
debasement of the nght to vote presents ajusticiable controversy under the Equal
Protection Clause).
294 See WALZER, supra note 22, at 78-79.
291 Professor Robert M. Cover argues that the Constitution has never been
neutral on the issue of race. See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial
Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1308 (1982).
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to participate simply cannot be honored in our liberal democracy296
Although this may appear to be a far-reaching claim, it is not. We accept
the claim that one does not have the right to use another against that
person's wishes to achieve one's own life plan.297 There will still be
situations where it is not so clear how to proceed when one person's
participation interest interferes with another's. It may not be possible to
resolve tis tension completely by simply appealing to normative values;
it certainly should not be resolved, however, by appealing to the
traditional free speech or traditional equality narrative. If tis tension
leads us to a logical bind, it is all the more reason for a commuracative
approach to engage the tension openly While we will not know
beforehand how tius paradox will be managed, by contextualizing it and
engaging in a communicative process, we can gain important insights. It
is useful to remember Berlin's warning not to confuse logical difficulty
with what happens in our communicative practice.29 s
IV HATE SPEECH IN THE
WORKPLACE AND UNIVERSITY RECONSIDERED
My goal in tlus Article is not to create a formula that will tell us how
to draw lines or to settle cases, but instead to aid in reconceptualizing our
approach to resolving the tension between free speech and equality My
primary objective has been to show the underlying problem as stemming
from attempts to address the issue of racist speech from one favored
narrative or another. In addition, I have tried to suggest an alterna-
tive approach that does not privilege free speech or equality It might
be useful, nonetheless, to sketch out how one could use participation
and harm when considering racist speech on campus and in the work-
place.
296 Professor Michel Rosenfeld correctly argues that the abstract notion of
equality, which requires that all be of equal worth, is the foundation of our
society. He goes on to argue that claims that require the compromising of the
moral autonomy of others must be disregarded. See ROSENFELD, supra note 211,
at 254. Tis is also required by the equality postulate Rosenfeld argues to be a
given in our society Any claim to the right to undermine another's right to
participate cannot be honored. Rosenfeld goes on to argue that this right is
primary to our situated notion of liberty or equality. Id.
297 MILL, supra note 21, at 13-17 (discussing self-regarding acts).
291 See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
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Because I have focused on participation m critical institutions, there
must be some determination of what is or is not a critical institution. This
is not totally uncharted water. The Court, for example, has addressed
similar issues in the context of institutions or clubs that discriminate in
membership. The Court's analysis has involved determining if there are
First Amendment associational rights implicated in these cases. The Court
has recognized that First Amendment associational rights, like First
Amendment free speech rights, are closely related to individual self-
development.299 Even where such rights are implicated, if the nature of
the institution is not private, the Court has balanced the First Amendment
interest with the equality interest. Implicitly, the Court has recognized
that these institutions are critical if they are public. It should also be
added that the Court has not simply relied on a formal notion of public
and private.3" In a number of cases, the Court has found that the First
Amendment associational interest is outweighed by the equality interest
of being part of public mstituations. 0 ' By inference, recognition of the
critical role that public institutions play in our society - as done by the
Court in New York State Club Association v. City of New York3"2 -
warrants different treatment from that given to a non-critical private club.
Similarly, the Court has long recognized the centrality of school and
education as critical institutions and their vital role in maintaining our
democratic values. 03 Despite the need to give more thought to what
constitutes critical institutions in our society, the workplace and institu-
tions of higher learning have already been appropriately identified. Both
the workplace and educational institutions are Important spaces in our
society for social and individual development. Work and school are
essential forms of social participation, and the relationships that occur in
299 See KARST, supra note 22, at 199-200.
"0 Although the Court uses "public" similarly to my use of "critical,"I think
"critical" is a better term. Unless it is clear that "private" has a non-formal
meaning, I think that the private-public distinction in law cannot be defended on
normative grounds.
301 See New York State Club Assoc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12-14
(1988) (affirming a local New York law which prevented private clubs and
associations from discrinination on the basis of race, sex, creed, and other
grounds).
302 Id.
303 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-23 (1982) (striking down a Texas
statute which withheld state funds from local school districts for children not
"legally admitted" to the state).
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both enhance individual identity and the capacity for autonomy In
addition, the construction and development of social values and truths
occur in both domains. Participation in particular kinds of work, for
example, allows one to participate m the social construction of expecta-
tions of groups to which one belongs. Having access to financial
resources also serves a number of values related to self-worth and
social worth in our society Without financial resources, one's autonomy
and social value are seriously called into question in our society Employ-
ment, of course, is more than a means to financial resources; it also
helps to define us and give our lives meaning. Through her employ-
ment, the plaintiff in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.3°4 is able
to participate in an ongoing social dialogue about the meaning of gen-
der.
The academy is important both for access to future employment and
for the development of individual and social meaning. To deny an
individual or group the right to participate in this creation of social values
denies a voice in the academic discourse, distorting and de-legitimizing
the values that result from this process. 05 Thus, the workplace and
college campus are critical institutions for the purpose of the analysis of
participation.
I stated earlier that speech and equality can harm, but that this
statement alone does not help in resolving the tension between the two
narratives. I have also pointed out that harm to participation is a special
injury that can undermine both free speech and equality, especially if the
injury occurs in critical institutions. Without precisely defining participa-
tion, I argue that participation involves individual or constitutive values,
as well as social or instrumental values. It is through the ability to
participate and belong to critical institutions that we constitute our-
selves,30 6 and it is through participation that we generate truth, values,
and norms. Harm to participation, then, is a constitutional harm that
violates both the First and the Fourteenth Amendments' values. Harm to
participation undermines the validity of all norms and values that are
created in flawed situations.
'04 Robinson v Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
305 Because these are scarcegoods, like the right to a particularjob or school,
not all members of society can have them. They still must be distributed,
however, in a way that is constitutive of our notion of equality of opportunity
and not inconsistent with the value of participation.
306 See BARBER, supra note 280, at xv, 150-55.
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Tis points to a different approach when judges and commenta-
tors are concerned about issues of racist speech. When the activity
or speech in question is being considered, it will still be useful
to determine whether the First Amendment protects the speech or if the
activity undermines equality, but this analysis will often not be
enough.
30 7
A. A Reconceptualized Approach
There are a number of other considerations that the analysis in
this Article suggests. This is particularly the case if there is a ten-
sion between conflicting normative values. 08 One must also consider
the harm and the context in which it occurred. In addition, one needs to
consider the values that are being promoted by the speech activity and
what the alternatives for promoting these values are. Tis approach
also suggests what the disputants might be asked to present to the Court.
It would not be enough for a person who wants to engage in activity that
harms participation simply to claim that it is protected or a liberty
Because it is hurtful, and particularly hurtful to other normative inter-
ests, the underlying value that the activity promotes should be consid-
ered. The party that is trying to stop the speech or equality activity
may be called upon to state how the disfavored activity is interfering
with the interest to participate and what the participation interest
IS.
A reconsideration of R.A. V., provides a chance to illustrate more
concretely how to address the conflict between free speech and equality
without privileging. In this case, the Court considered the constitutionality
of a city ordinance that proscribed abusive speech which would insult,
injure, or provoke violence on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or
gender. The Court held that the ordinance was viewpoint discriminatory
and therefore unconstitutional.310
307 1 would argue that most speech should be protected by the First
Amendment. I would also argue for an expansive, substantive notion of equality
that is not co-terminus with anti-discrimination.
308 1 have focused on the tension between free speech and equality. Similar
concerns may be raised when there is a tension between free speech and privacy
or between equality and church/state concerns.




The Court privileged free speech by essentializing3 ' and by failing
to see a conflict with equality In fact, the Court adopted a much more
extreme view than libertarians such as Professor Strossen because it did
not even acknowledge that equality concerns exist in this case.312 The
Court framed R.A. V as raising solely free speech issues,3 13 which must
311 As the Court explains the reasons for exclusion of "fighting words"
from the scope of the First Amendment, it sanctifies and essentializes free
speech. It does so by labeling "fighting words" as "'non-speech' element[s] of
commuication." Id. at 386. Through its characterization of proscribable speech
- "fighting words" - as not speech, it deftly Implies that all "speech" is
protected.
The Court's citation to Justice Frankffurter's opuuon in Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfirter, J., concurnng) ("fighting
words are thus analogous to a noisy soundtrack both can be used to
convey an idea; but neither has, in and of itself, a claim upon the First
Amendment"), should not be seen as legitimizing its sleight of hand. R.A. V,
505 U.S. at 386. First, Frankfurter's opimon is merely a concurrence, so its
precedential weight is questionable. Second, Frankfurter's opimon also
privileges free speech. The tension between free speech and equality will never
be adequately addressed if American jurisprudence remains nured in the morass
of privileging.
312 The Court portrays the case as involving issues of censorship when the
case could just as, if not more, easily be seen as raising issues of equality. The
defendants were prosecuted under the St. Paul ordinance for placing a burning
cross in the front yard of the home of an African-Amencan family, which had
recently moved into a predominantly white neighborhood. The incident took
place at mght. Such conduct historically has been used to terrorize African-
Americans, especially those who had the "audacity" to move into a white area
or to speak out against the unequal treatment they have received. The effect of
such terror tactics has been and continues to be the impairment of African-
Americans' freedom to exercise choice about where they live, send their children
to school, and do business. This conduct also impedes the right to freedom from
discrimination.
313 Professor Lawrence provides a powerful critique of the Court's approach
to the case.
The Court was not concerned with how this attack might impede the
exercise of the Joneses' constitutional right to be full and valued
participants in the political community, for it did not view R.A. V as a
case about the Joneses' injury. Instead, the Court was concerned
primarily with the alleged constitutional injury to those who assaulted
the Joneses, that is, the First Amendment rights of crossbumers.
Lawrence, supra note 72, at 788-89 (footnotes omitted).
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be decided solely in accordance with First Amendment principles.3"4
The extreme lengths to which the Court privileged free speech are
illustrated by its insistence that the speech regulation must be content-
neutral even though it fully admits that burning crosses are not constitu-
tionally protected speech. The Court reasoned as if its content-based
argument is value neutral, as if the only logical and inevitable conclusion
is to strike down the ordinance.3" 5 The way the Court relied on content-
based analysis exemplifies how essentializing free speech can warp
judicial thinking. The form of analysis applied by the Court completely
ignored issues of equality even though the prohibition of content-based
regulations is properly understood as protecting equality- preventing
powerful actors or the government from discriminating against members
of less powerful groups by suppressing their dissenting voices.316
The Court can plausibly assert the objectivity of its decision only by
treating free speech principles as foundational and equality concerns as
subsidiary or irrelevant. The Court disregarded the significance of
equality principles in several ways. Like many traditional libertarians, the
Court n imized the concrete harm that speech can inflict.317 The Court
also exhibited its disregard for equality concerns by viewing speech
314 This is most dramatically illustrated when the Court tries to address
Justice White's argument made in his concurring opinion, which privileges the
equality narrative. "This Court itself has occasionally fused the First Amendment
into the Equal Protection Clause but at least with the acknowledgement
(which Justice White cannot afford to make) that the First Amendment underlies
its analysis." R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 385 n.4.
315 The Court asserts that St. Paul violates the content-neutral requirement
by proscribing fighting words that communicate messages of racial, gender, or
religious intolerance. "Selectivity of this sort creates the possibility that the
city is seeking to handicap the expression of particular ideas. That possibility
would alone be enough to render the ordinance presumptively invalid "Id.
at 394.
316 See Police Dep't v Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("There is an
'equality of status m the field of ideas,' and government must afford all points
of view an equal opportunity to be heard."); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality and the
First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV 20, 29-35 (1975) (arguing for the use of
the equality principle to protect against content censorship); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv 189,
201 (1983) (arguing that there is a connectionbetweenthe content-based/content-
neutral distinction and the concept of equality).
317 The Court declared that "the only interest distinctively served by the
content limitation is that of displaying the city council's special hostility towards
the particular biases thus singled out." R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 396.
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through a historical lens.318 The Court's refusal to allow lustory and
context to inform its analysis of the meaning of various speech acts is
unjustified on its face. That even the most stridently conservative Justice,
Clarence Thomas, has recognized the relevance of history and context,
however, reveals flus approach to be not only unreasonable but also
extreme.319 Although the Court acknowledged that protecting members
of traditionally oppressed groups is compelling, it then quickly raised the
specter of censorship to justify its essentialization of free speech.32
This censorship argument contains flaws m two respects. First, it does not
account for the continuing discriminatory practices and attitudes which
silence or, in other words, censor excluded groups.32' Second, this
argument does not specify what concrete harm would come from
censorship or even what censorship means in real terms. The threat of
censorship is simply invoked to end the conversation about other harms,
in this case historical discrimination of certain groups and how that bears
upon the hate speech controversy The conversation should not end,
however, unless one presupposes that free speech is at the top of the
slippery slope. In other words, the censorship argument is yet another
manifestation of privileging.
To contribute to the mediation of the tension between free speech and
equality, the Court would have to overcome its Cartesian Anxiety, which
318 In criticizing the ordinance's prohibition of only fighting words that
disparage based on race, color, creed, religion, or gender, the Court mocks St.
Paul's attempt to account for the qualitatively different injuries caused by hate
speech against members of histoncally oppressed groups. "St. Paul has no such
authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the
other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules." Id. at 392.
319 Justice Thomas, while tracing the evolution of the meaning and use of the
burning cross in America, admits that the KKK's use of the burning cross cannot
be seen reasonably as a religious symbol: "The Klan simply has appropriated one
of the most sacred of religious symbols as a symbol of hate. In my mind, this
suggests that this case may not have truly involved the Establishment Clause
"Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2451
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
320 The Court asserts, "the 'danger of censorship' presented by a facially
content-based statute, requires that weapon be employed only where it is
'necessary to serve the asserted [compelling] interest."' R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 395
(quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1444 (1991) and Burson v.
Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1852 (1992)).
321 This flaw decimates the Court's analysis because hate speech remains one




has induced the Court's ongoing, elusive quest for discovering the bright
lines that would, m theory, infallibly guide legal analysis. The Court
would also have to cease its essentialization of speech. An important step
for the Court m this process would be to rethink how it applies its
content-based analysis. If the Court took a hard look at how it applies the
content-based doctrine, it would realize that the doctrine embodies and
serves equality concerns. 22 In addition to reconsidering the content-
based doctrine, the Court should contemplate its reasoning in Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc.,3 23 which articulates equality concerns. Taking
these steps would enable the Court to more fully identify the values
implicated by hate speech. By teasing out the common points of the
incommensurable principles, in tis case free speech and equality, the
Court could craft a basis for evaluating hate speech and speech regula-
tion. I have suggested that the most helpful way of mediating the tension
between free speech and equality, in ths context, is by comparing the
harm to meaningful participation in critical institutions caused by hate
speech and regulation respectively
Under this approach, the Court, rather than approaching the St. Paul
ordinance as an ominous limitation of expression, could consider the
ordinance in the context of the Jones family's participatory interests as
full members of the community The Court should evaluate these interests
against the youths' participatory interests in expressing their hatred for
Affican-Americans. This evaluative process should be informed by the
nature of race relations in America, historically and today The Court may
come to the same conclusion that the ordinance is unconstitutional,
although I doubt it. The ordinance does not prohibit the expression of the
ideas; rather, it considers when the ideas are expressed, to whom, and the
likely effects. Regardless of the result, American jurisprudence would
benefit from this contextualized, more thoroughly thought-out approach
to issues raised by hate speech.
Although this is a reconceptualized approach, it is not a complete
break from what courts already do. One reason, for example, that racial
discrimination in the employment or school context is prohibited is
because workplaces and schools are critical institutions in our society, and
discrimination often injures the ability to participate. One can imagine
situations when racial discrimmation does not implicate participation in
" Tis presupposes that the Court ceases to minimize the harms caused by
speech and begins a contextualized, histoncally-informed evaluation of the
incommensurability of the free speech and equality paradigms.
23 Hams v Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
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critical institutions. For example, in New York State Club Associa-
tion,3 24 there was no question that the clubs discriminated and that there
were First Amendment association rights implicated.3 25 The case,
however, turned on the nature of the club. If it were truly non-critical and
private, the discrimination would not impose a bamer to participation. In
this case, the Court correctly found that the nature of the club was critical
for conducting business, and the associational interests, while present,
were not substantial.
This suggests another way the Court might look at racist speech in a
particular context. Such an analysis might entail the Court first determm-
ing how inportant the institution or location is for generating individual
and social participation values, what the particular participation interests
are, and whether they can be adequately exercised in a different context
without substantial burden. The Court should also consider the nature of
the speech activity and the extent to which this interest is tied to the
particular context. If the speech activity injures participation and is not
strongly recognized in the particular context, tlus would weigh in favor
of proscribing the speech activity In addition, the Court might examine
how the speech activity injures the participation values and if the speech
activity itself is also tied to strong participation interests. If the speech
activity is closely related to the exclusion of others, such exclusion would
militate for less protection of the speech activity by the Court in this
context. Alternatives open to the different parties should also be
considered. If there are participation interests, both in the speech activity
and in injuring the participation of others, then the Court must balance
the conflict; the Court must try to accommodate both sets of interests, by
assessing the seriousness of the injury on either side and the alternatives
available. It may also be relevant whether the participation interests in
conflict are of the same order. For example, if the interest on one side is
intrinsic and the interest on the other side is instrumental or social, the
Court may decide in a particular context to value one over the other or
that one is more closely tied to the context itself. In assessing the harm,
the Court may also want to consider the formal and non-formal inpacts
324 New York State Club Assoc. v City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
325 Id. There will also be situations where participation interests are
Implicated and there has not been any showing of discrimination. See Metro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding FCC laws with minority
ownership preferences on the grounds that congressional and FCC policies do not
exist solely as remedies for discrimination).
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of the harm. For example, the Court may want to know how the target
group experiences the harm. 26
B. The Workplace
In the Robinson327 case, for example, the Court should start its
analysis by looking at the context in which this conflict occurs. If the
Court finds that this is a critical institution, it should then see if the
speech activity of the men injures the social and constitutive participation
interests of the women. In order to answer this question, the Court will
need to identify what those participation interests are.328 It will also
need to identify what the expressive interests of the men are in this
context. If it finds that the men's speech act does injure the participation
interests of the women, then the Court must consider how proscribing
such activities would injure the interests of the men and how not
proscribing the activity would injure the interests of the women. Ideally,
the Court would attempt to structure the environment so that the men's
participation activity will not be injured or injure the women's participa-
tion. As stated above, one group's participation interests should not be
honored if they are predicated on the exclusion of others. It would be
significant if one could show that by allowing the pictures and sexually
explicit statements in the workplace, women would be effectively
prevented or disadvantaged from participating in the workplace. This
would be especially true if one could show that the men have a number
of alternative forums in which to engage in such activity It is also
relevant to the extent that the men's and women's participation interests
326 This is, in fact, what a federal court attempted to do by considering a
reasonable woman standard. Robinson v Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F
Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991). This is also what Professor Michelman
refers to in his discussion of racist speech. He distinguishes between the formalist
position, where actual legal bamers exist, the realist position, where informal
structures and practices exist that undermine participation, and the experiential
position, where the targeted group experiences the racist speech acts in question.
See Michelman, supra note 151, passim.
327 Robinson, 760 F Supp. at 1486.
32' Even if one has an interest or right to participate, it may nonetheless be
limited. Consider a courtroom: a non-party or journalist may have a right to be
present but not to speak. In a biology lab, a student may have a right to speak
but not necessarily about politics. In other words, as exemplified by the




are constitutive and individual, as opposed to social and instrumental. 29
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,33 ° the Court considered the inter-
ests implicated, distinguishing between those interests that were intimate
and intrinsic and those that were instrumental or social. The Court
accorded more weight to intrinsic interests and, therefore, was willing to
sacrifice instrumental associational interests to stop discrimination. 3 '
In Robinson, the men complained that the removal of the pictures and
the proscribing of some speech activity would harm their First Amend-
ment rights. Once the claim that there is another constitutional normative
value at issue is credibly raised, however, the men should be asked which
First Amendment right or value is being mjured.332 The men may assert
that their expressive rights are being injured if they have to remove the
posters and stop making sexual comments. It becomes important to
examine what their expressive rights are in this context. The court may
find, in this situation, that the expressive interests of the workers have
been substantially limited.333 The court might find that the men have a
329 This is not to suggest that there is always a clear divide between what I
call constitutive and social participation. Despite this fact, it may still be useful
to examine the question. To the extent it is clear that the nature of the location
in question is instrumental, there is less validity to the claim that proscribing a
constitutive participation activity that injures another is a serious violation. One
could argue that in the workplace one does not expect to have the same degree
of constitutive participation as one does in some locations of a university, or a
public or private setting.
330 Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (holding that the
application of the Minnesota Human Rights Act to the United States Jaycees,
requiring them to admit females as regular members, did not violate members'
freedom of association).
Id. at 617-19
332 One must be careful not to privilege by simply refusing to recognize the
other value, which is what the court did in UWM Post, Inc. v Board of Regents,
774 F Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
333 I have used "private" similarly to "critical." Saying that the workplace in
this situation is private does not address the issue. The question remains, "is the
workplace a critical institution?" Rather than focusing on the private/public
distinction, I believe it would be important for the court to consider what the
expressive interests in a particular context are and why. To the extent that the
interests are limited, they would not weigh in the balance. Even if the workplace
is a critical institution, there may be limited expression rights. There are a
number of additional concerns that can limit expressive interests, given context
and function as illustrated by the extent to which one has the right to express
oneself in a courtroom or at a public university in a biology lab.
[VOL. 85
WORLDS APART
right to possess or look at pictures of nude women, but nonetheless not
where others can see them. In other words, the court's acknowledgment
of a right to a certain form of expression does not automatically confer
a right to impose such expression on members of a particular group, m
this case female co-workers.
What if they asserted that their participation interests m creating
norms or truth-finding is being mjured? Again, tis may not be as strong
a claim in the workplace as in other contexts. Indeed, in the Robinson
context, this claim may be undermined by the acceptance of the
employer's prohibition of political pictures and posters without objec-
tions."' It is not that these men do not have any interest in having these
posters up. They may have such an interest and be harmed by the
removal. The Court should, however, call on the men to state what the
interest or harm is and what the analysis is in the context of the claim.
Simply asserting free speech rights does not do this.
C. The University
The umversity is a much more complex setting. It has attributes
similar to a home, a public forum, a public or private club, a public
accommodation, and a workplace. Each of these locations may call for
a different treatment under tlus analysis, and each location may implicate
a different set of participation interests. Nonetheless, a similar process of
identifying the harms, values, contexts, and alternatives would be useful
for each setting. Looking at one of the incidents that has occurred on the
Stanford Umversity campus will help to illustrate flus. After an argument
with a black student about Beethoven's race, two white students defaced
a poster of Beethoven, giving him exaggerated black features, and then
put the poster on the door of the black student's room. 335 It seems
plausible that the speech act was racial and hurtful. If one examines the
act under the analysis discussed above, the location of the act does not
appear to involve a critical institution, as I have been using the term in
this article. It would be difficult, therefore, for the black student to show
how Ins participation interest is being compromised. Although the wite
students may have an expressive interest in defacing the poster, it is not
at all clear that they have an expressive interest in placing the poster on
the black student's door.336 The white students would make a much
33' Robinson v Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F Supp. 1486, 1494 (M.D.
Fla. 1991).
33' Lawrence, supra note 33, at 456 n.101, 479 n.165.
336 In addition, placing the poster on the door raises private property and
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stronger argument for having an expressive interest if they placed the
poster on their own door. Under the former facts, the analysis I have
offered would not be particularly instructive in resolving tlus matter,
except to make it clear that neither students had clear participation
interests present. An additional benefit of the analysis, that I have
suggested, is that it also allows for the acknowledgement that there is a
possible injury, even if the injury is not ultimately constitutionalized.337
One's right to participate and one's autonomy can never be held
paramount to the degree that they allow one to destroy another or to use
a person against that person's will.33 Although there are a number of
difficult choices that must still be addressed under this approach, the
approach makes some of the vexing questions much clearer and easier to
address. For example, the targeted racial epithet may not raise serious
questions about whether to regulate if such speech activity has a
substantial impact on the targeted parties' participation and is not tied to
legitimate participation rights of the speaker. Another advantage of this
strategy is that it would avoid denying harms and trying to decide
acontextually wich categories of speech are protected or not. In
analyzing such activity, it is useful to look at the value the activity is
promoting as well as the injury it is likely to cause. Threatening or
intimidating speech often has little expressive value in a particular
context. The actor may not be interested in participating in the larger
community, or may only be interested in participating in a way that
injures the participation interest of others. The person's expressive
activity in this instance is often designed not to solicit a response, but to
drive the other person out of the community This is, in fact, often the
effect.339 Where social and inherent participation values are implicated,
trespass issues.
... I am aware that there may be other non-participation interests involved
in any of these situations. For example, the black student may have privacy and
property interests implicated when the poster was placed on his door. It is
appropriate to consider such interests, but such an approach is beyond the scope
of this Article.
338 It is for smilar reasons that Professor Baker argues that there is no right
to speak to an unwilling listener. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 302 n.41, n.43.
339 Other commentators have similarly argued that such speech can be
regulated. There are a number of reasons given, such as speech is more like an
act when it is coercive and when it is a situation-alerter. In most instances,
commentators argue that such speech has little expressive value and is not core
First Amendment speech. I suggest that this is not always a useful distinction.
What this distinction wrongly suggests is that if it were core First Amendment
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the state has a constitutional free speech and equality interest in limiting
the harm to individuals. This may involve balancing one harm against
another, winch would be a social, as opposed to a liberty, question. It is
specifically this compelling state interest that allows the government to
regulate speech acts that are otherwise protected. There also may be good
reason to weigh more heavily a participation interest that is constitutive
than an interest that is social. It is also clear that some racist speech does
directly unplicate or injure participation and undermine free speech and
equality
D. Is There a Problem with Balancing Rights?
This approach suggests that when activities that otherwise reflect
constitutional norms injure First Amendment speech values or Fourteenth
Amendment equality values, one must balance the interests. One may
object to the notion of balancing in the area of constitutional rights.
The notion of rights is that they are something that one has which do
not have to be balanced.34° One can only maintain this position, howev-
er, under conditions in which rights do not cause unacceptable harms and
do not conflict with other rights. When both of these conditions hold,
rights should be given broad protection and should not be balanced. A
problem remains, however, because in a number of situations neither of
these conditions hold true,34" ' especially m the context of racist speech
activity
The balancing of constitutional rights generally already occurs,342
so the question is not whether to do it but rather how to do it in a
principled way ... In other words, the pivotal issue regarding balancing
is not whether it should be done, but how to do it. If two values or rights
speech, it could not be prohibited. This claim cannot be made, however, without
considenng the harm. First Amendment speech that causes constitutional speech
and equality harm can and, at times, should be regulated.
340 See RONALD DWoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90-94 (1978)
(distinguishing "rights" which are absolute, from "goals" which encourage
society to make trade-offs).
341 For example, speech activity can cause unacceptable harms in cases that
involve blackmail or threats. Conflict between rights can take many forms, such
as when a speech value, participation, and a non-speech value, privacy, conflict.
342 See DwORKIN, supra note 340, at 93.
3' For a discussion of how to balance competing normative claims, see id.
Professor Dworkin's analysis, however, is limited by his failure to address how
to balance without a metalanguage. Mediating competing narratives does not
simply involve compromise. See HABERMAS, supra note 101.
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are incommensurable, there is not an obvious method for balancing them.
Balancing between three pounds and five pounds is relatively easy;
however, how does one balance between five pounds and the color green?
I have argued that participation and harm are the interests that can be
used to balance or mediate between free speech and equality They allow
for a comparison between some of the free speech interests and some of
the equality interests. Even if my effort has not completely succeeded, it
seems clear that some alternative to the pnvileging, in which most
commentators and courts have engaged, must be used. The need to
identify some mediating approach to afford a real dialogue should be
apparent and undisputed.
In fact, some commentators recognize the widespread practice of
privileging and its consequences and thus have begun to try to move
beyond the either/or conceptual trap ensnaring courts and commentators
alike. Professor Delgado, for example, has taken important steps to escape
the oppositional framework by ceasing to privilege either the free speech
or the equality narratives: "neither value seems logically prior to the
other; each is necessary for the full expression of the other. Interpretive
communities are necessary for speech; speech is a necessary tool to
restore, adjust, and refine community "' In so saying, Professor
Delgado articulates essentially the same theme of this Article: the need
to mediate between free speech and equality through the dialogical
engagement of paradigms.
Professor Delgado's thinking seems guided by his adoption of the
"interpretive community hypothesis." '345 This hypothesis predicts that
responses by the world's societies to ethnic and religious unrest are
grounded in the desire for self-preservation.346 Professor Delgado
3" See Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, A Shifting Balance: Freedom of
Expression and Hate-Speech Restriction, 78 IowA L. REv 737, 750 (1993).
3" This hypothesis is articulated in the ground-breaking book STRIKING A
BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION
(Sandra Coliver ed., 1992) [hereinafter STRIKING A BALANCE].
346 See Stefancic & Delgado, supra note 344, at 748. To illustrate the
accuracyof tlus hypothesis, Professor Delgado compares two countries' responses
to hate speech that are discussed in STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 345.
India, for example, has both a strong commitment to democracy and a
recent history of bitter ethie and religious conflict. The interpretive
community hypothesis predicts that such a society would take strong
action to curb violence, discourage racist speech, and restore the fragile
interpretive community that is part of its democratic heritage and ideals;
indeed, it has done this.
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expands upon this insight, arguing that there may be no single balance.
"The appropriate balance between equality and freedom of expression
may be a complex, shifting matrix that includes several different forces
,34 Other commentators also recognize the evolving and nuanced
nature of balancing and that such balancing is distinct from mere
compromising.348 In fact, mere compromise may produce undesirable
results. These observations underscore the postmodernist insight that there
can be no transcendental standard by which one can determine if a form
of speech should be regulated. Thus, although Professor Delgado does not
explicitly propose the promotion of participatory interests as the
mediating principle as I have, he nonetheless characterizes the method by
which the tension between free speech and equality can be resolved in a
similar fashion.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article has been to expose and challenge the
privileging that occurs when courts and commentators try to deal with the
tension between free speech and equality, and to suggest an alternative.
This effort to avoid simply favoring one narrative over the other is made
more difficult because of the problem of comparing apparently incom-
mensurable paradigms. What is at stake is more than a philosophical
debate about the correct description of the problem. The struggle over
language can reproduce all struggles over material wealth, power, and
privilege. More is to be gained or lost than a story The concerns of free
speech and racial equality are fundamental to our society We bring to
these issues a great deal of passion and concern. I assume that there are
many others who, like Professors Lawrence and Strossen, realize that it
Stefancic & Delgado, supra note 344, at 748 (footnotes omitted).
Professor Delgado then discusses the former Soviet Umon, which has been
plagued by a history of centralized, totalitarian rule.
Such a society would not likely rely on shared expression, dialogue, and
other forms of communicationto bind itself together. Rather, centralized
authority serves that purpose. When intergroup conflict breaks out, the
impulse to restore a communicativeparadigm will be weak. Consequent-
ly, laws against hate speech will not be m force. If they are, they are
apt to be used eccentrically, as in the case of dissidents.
Id. at 748-49 (footnotes omitted).
311 Stefancic & Delgado, supra note 344, at 749.
348 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986); HABERMAS,
supra note 101, ROSENFELD, supra note 211.
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is important to try to embrace both values, and who believe that to
prevail by power would make the victory worse than meaningless and
without moral force.349 I address this Article to this group of people m
particular.
I have tried to tease out a common ground, a shared story within
these two narratives by using participation and harm as mediating
principles. This effort not only suggests common values and interests, it
also reconceptualizes free speech and equality Indeed it hints at another
narrative that is already deeply grounded in free speech and equality This
story of the need for participation moves us from two apparently
incommensurable narratives toward two sets of values that share a
substantial common language. It allows us to valorize the values and
goals of free speech and equality, while being able to compare them. In
sketching out the common language for free speech and equality in this
Article, I recognize that this project is incomplete. I hope, however, that
this Article will advance the dialogue concerning the tension between free
speech and equality Indeed, if I am right, the'problem will not be solved
in closed or abstract logic, but must be addressed m an open, dialogical
process. These questions must remain open for present and future
participants to examine. In other words, I do not intend for the approach
I advocate to be a conversation-ending strategy
In claiming that participation and harm are a useful place to begin the
effort of mediating this conflict, I have also tried to show that adherence
to the general liberal principle undergirding our society requires
opportuity for real participation. It is through this participation that our
social meaning for liberty and equality are produced and legitimated.
Such participation must be mindful of domination and coercion.
My efforts have been informed by the work of two sets of commenta-
tors. One group of theorists has begun to move away from the claim that
there is no injury caused by speech or equality The second group of
commentators has started to recognize that part of the difficulty of
dealing with racist speech may be complicated by the problem of'
incommensurability Neither group adequately addresses the issues of
privileging and the need to mediate between the two narratives.35°
... For one narrative to prevail over another would be in conflict with the
entire claim of the Enlightenment foundation, wich does not recogmze
legitimacy in force or domination.
350 Professors Delgado and Grey expressly address the issue of two
incommensurable paradigms in the context of the tension between free speech
and equality. See Delgado, Campus Anti-Racism Rules, supra note 20, at 383;
Thomas C. Grey, Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties: The Case of Discriminatory
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Indeed, Professor Thomas C. Grey, one of the few scholars who even
raises the issue of mediation, ultimately resolves the tension by simply
favoring what he calls the civil libertarian narrative.351 He acknowledg-
es that his effort will leave civil rights advocates unsatisfied. He does not
appear to understand, however, that it is precisely because he privileges
the free speech narrative that Ins efforts are unsatisfactory 352 He tries
to show how equality is instrumental, while free speech is intrinsic. It is
Professor Grey's inadequate understanding of equality, particularly Ins
failure to understand the constitutive role of participation, that produces
this error.
3 53
The importance of participation becomes even more apparent if one
accepts the assumption that there is no objective truth to which we can
appeal m a monological way, either to resolve our conflicts or to know
the world. Although most legal commentators appear to have accepted the
criticism of foundationalism and natural categories, 354 the implications
of this have not been taken seriously in the free speech/equality debate.
This Article is an attempt to come to grips with the implications of anti-
foundationalist claims: that norms and values are contextually bound and
communicatively "redeemed." This insight militates for giving participa-
tion the priority m all claims of legitimation strategies. It is not a set
meaning of either free speech or equality that defines what is necessary
in society; rather it is participation that gives meaning and content to
Verbal Harassment, 8 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 81, 102 (1991) (discussing the
tension between civil rights and civil liberties m the context of verbal harassment
on college campuses).
Professor Delgado was also one of the first commentators to make explicit
the harm that speech can cause. See Delgado, Words that Wound, supra note 79,
at 135-49. For a more recent discussion of these injuries, see Lawrence, supra
note 33, at 458-66; Matsuda, supra note 45, at 2326-41.
311 Professor Grey ultimately resolves the tension by arguing that equality is
instrumental and free speech is intrinsic. He therefore resolves the tension within
the larger, more "fundamental" free speech narrative. Grey, supra note 350.
Professor Grey's position seems plausible, then, because he unessentializes
equality.
352 rd.
153 He sees equality mainly as an anti-discrimination norm. For a critique of
this position, see KARST, supra note 22, at 37-42, 235-42; TRIBE, supra note 65,
at 1436-1687 He also fails to address the normative foundation of participation.
See WALzER, supra note 22, at 31-35.
354 See RORTY, supra note 17, at 3-22; UNGER, supra note 17
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society, free speech, and equality It is through participation that we
engage m what Professor Nelson Goodman calls "worldmaking." 3"
I have, however, suggested more. It is through participation that we
are given to ourselves, and our interests and needs are defined and
transformed. Participation takes on both an epistemological and ontologi-
cal significance.
The other mediating interest that I have suggested in this Article is
harm. Harm is already recognized in both the free speech and equality
narratives. I have argued that there is reason to believe or construct a
notion of harm that is similar in both contexts and that is not so broad
that it destroys free speech or equality Not all harms are to be avoided,
but only a limited class of harms. I have identified the central harm that
is to be avoided as the harm to participation and membership and, as a
corollary, the harm to commumcative self-respect and autonomy There
are other harms, such as offense, that will not rise to tis level. I have
argued that the harm which undermines, distorts, or destroys the ability
to participate in critical institutions and locations is of the first order and
should be cognizable in and regulated by our jurisprudence.
Even as we approach the ideal conditions for participation, we may
not make the correct decision. By trying to mediate the tension between
incommensurable narratives, however, we will be getting closer to
making decisions the correct way
Free speech and equality should be promoted by this approach, m
part, because they support, and are necessary for, participation. When
there is a sharp conflict between free speech and equality, I would try to
resolve the tension in a way that protects the right of participation.356
To the extent that privileging takes place without being grounded m a
larger social value, it only reflects the preferences, biases, and power of
the commentator or judge. Tins raises serious questions about legitimacy
that can undermine participation and democracy
In closing, I would like to underscore the fundamental point I have
sought to make in this Article: we must resolve the tension between free
speech and equality (and any other incommensurable values) without
privileging one narrative over the other. One may question the legitimacy
355 GOODMAN, supra note 4, at 1, 56.
356 The most acute tension is likely to come up in public or semi-public
settings. However, what is public versus private will also be an issue. For a case
where the Court focuses on First Amendment issues, equality issues, and the line
between public and private, see New York State Club Assoc. v. City of New
York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
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of participation and harm as appropriate values to mediate this tension.
While there is certainly room for debate on this matter, I have made an
effort to justify why I believe these to be the best mediating values. This
process of substantiating, rather than merely asserting the primacy of
certain values, is vital to a truly open and ultimately constructive
dialogical process. I have tried to emphasize thus point in my discussion
by showing that one cannot legitimately assert the superiority of one set
of values over others.
I firmly believe in the feasibility of mediating without privileging
because, even though we speak from different narratives that describe
different worlds, language remains open and all worlds touch at some
point. Thus, as we move to mediate these worlds, there is the possibility
a common language will be created that describes and transforms the
common ground and the different narratives. If such a mediation is to
take place, however, the illusion of both the god's eye view and the
infinite other must be avoided. The former assumes that there is an
objective foundation that relieves one from engaging with the other. It
demes the concrete otherness of the other. The latter assumes that there
is no way of communicating with the other, that there is no possibility of
finding or creating a common and shared language.3"7 We must avoid
the complimentary illusions of believing that we are radically the same
or radically different. We must be suspicious of domination that hides
behind radical objectivism and radical relativism. Either position would
obviate the need or usefulness of participation.
It is because we are both the same and different that dialogue is
necessary and possible.
... For a good discussion of the first problem, see FEMINISM/POST-
MODERNISM (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990). For a discussion of the second issue,
see Cornell, supra note 10.
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